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Documents

April 17, 1951

Telegram No. 209 from Taipei to the Department of State, 'Political Report on Nationalist China - March 1951'

This telegram highlights improving morale on Formosa driven by increased US military and economic support and Communist purges on the mainland, which deepened anti-Communist sentiment.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

October 13, 1954

Despatch No. 178 from American Embassy Taipei to the Department of State, 'Chiang Ching-kuo'

Recounts an interview between Dr. Paul F. Langer and General Chiang Ching-kuo, focusing on the latter's authoritarian approach to governance and anti-Communist efforts. General Chiang emphasized the necessity of subordinating civil liberties to the campaign against Communism and criticized the Western-educated Chinese elite for being out of touch with grassroots realities. Langer observed Chiang's strong leadership qualities and authoritarian nature, predicting his continued influence in Free China.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

November 6, 1967

Petition on Opposition to the Coming to Japan of Taiwan’s National Defense Minister Chiang

Kawase Ikkan insists that the Japanese Government must cancel the upcoming visit by Chiang Ching-kuo for the sake of the country's relations with Mainland China.

November 1967

Statement of Nakajima Kenzo, Chairman of the Board, Opposing the Visit of Prime Minister Sato to the United States and Protesting the Coming to Japan of Chiang Ching-kuo

Nakajima Kenzo, a leading figure in the Japan China Cultural Exchange Association, denounces the impending visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to Japan.

November 21, 1967

Cable No. 705, Ambassador Shimazu (Taipei) to the Foreign Minister, 'Visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to Japan'

The Japanese Ambassador in Taipei warns that Chiang Ching-kuo's upcoming visit to Japan could trigger a "serious incident" with China if the visit is not well thought out in advance.

August 27, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."

October 9, 1956

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-56, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."

January 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Political Succession on Taiwan: An Intelligence Assessment'

The CIA's Office of East Asian Analysis concludes that "Chiang Ching-kuo is likely to be succeeded by a collegial, technocratic leadership governing in a somewhat less authoritarian style. The immediate succession will be dominated by a collegium of older mainlanders and is expected to go smoothly. Differences within this group over internal or foreign policy issues are unlikely to trigger a major power struggle."

This document has been review and declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency on at least two separate occasions. The above version was approved for release on January 20, 2010. An alternative version, with different material withheld, was approved for release on May 12, 2011.

November 1982

National Intelligence Council Memorandum, 'China and Taiwan: Attitudes, Policies, and Options'

The United States' interests in its relationships with China and Taiwan would be best served if Beijing and Taipei could reach some form of accommodation or association that would permit the two parts of China to coexist peacefully. The worst outcome would be a military confrontation that forced the United States to choose whether to provide .assistance to Taiwan or to allow it to be overwhelmed by superior Chinese force. Trends over the past four years have moved fitfully toward an eventual accommodation, and they probably will continue in this direction.

June 28, 1974

Central Intelligence Agency, Weekly Review Special Report, 'Nationalist China Revisited'

A CIA memorandum evaluating the domestic politics and international relations of Taiwan in 1974. 

This version of "Nationalist China Revisited" was declassified by the CIA on September 25, 1999. An alternate version was declassified on September 28, 2004. The release from 1999 includes fewer redactions than the version declassified five-years later.

Pagination