Kohl and Major discuss the impact of the war in former Yugoslavia on the Muslim world, the European Community and domestic U.S. policy. Both agree that there was a window of opportunity for a settlement before the winter.

Kohl and Major discuss the situation in former Yugoslavia and the need to draw a red line to stop Serbian attacks in the Bosnian war. Both emphasize a potential change in NATO's posture moving from a a peace keeping operation toward a peace enforcing position entailing the possibility of full-fledged war against the Bosnian Serbs.

Kohl and Panic review the situation in Yugoslavia and Panic's standing in the domestic struggle with Milosevic. Panic emphasizes his readiness to recognize Slovenia and Croatia reiterating that a democratic Yugoslavia could be a catalyst for peace in the entire region. Kohl remains doubtful arguing that Milosevic would not support such a policy.

Mitterrand emphasizes that Yugoslavia could turn into "a second Vietnam” in case of a Western military intervention.  He questions the rational of U.S. and British policy in the Balkans and rejects France's military involvement. Kohl rules out Germany's participation in military operations.

Kohl and Kucan discuss the disintegration of Yugoslavia and emphasize the need for minority rights, self determination and the non-use of force. Kohl explains his position arguing that Germany must not be "singularized" in its diplomacy.

Kohl and Separovic examine the situation in Croatia against the backdrop of the fact that the Yugoslavian People's Army was just 30km away from Zagreb. Separovic asks for assistance and international recognition. 

Kohl and Andreotti elaborate on the timing of Slovenia's and Croatia's recognition. Due to the lack of consensus on this within the EC, they agree to go ahead with a group of five or six countries recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Both emphasize the need to avoid a repetition of the 1941 World War II coalition in this regard.

Kohl and Gonzalez discuss the potential for European integration after Germany's unification and the urge for fast action after the coup in Moscow. They review the ensuing war in Yugoslavia and the need for the Federal Republic to avoid going it alone in its efforts for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

Kohl and Peterle analyze the situation in Yugoslavia and Milosevic's alleged readiness to allow for Slovenia's independence. Kohl emphasizes that it was out of the question for the Federal Republic to recognize Slovenia and Croatia at this points in time as the FRG did not want to abandon the EC consensus prior to the Maastricht Summit.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 24 August 1991 describes the latest developments in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Lebanon, France, El Salvador, South Africa, China and Iran.