On April 28, 1975, Kissinger urgently informed the Soviet Union that North Vietnamese forces had begun shelling Saigon’s airport and the U.S. Embassy complex, killing two Marines and disrupting the evacuation, which he claimed violated an assumed two-week timeframe and risked forcing American military intervention. Ambassador Dobrynin dismissed Kissinger’s insinuations of Soviet involvement.

In an April 22, 1975 conversation, Henry Kissinger conveyed President Ford's concern to the Soviet Union about North Vietnamese troop movements near Saigon's airport, warning that any attempt to trap Americans could force US military intervention, while General Scowcroft clarified that Marines were positioned offshore for potential deployment but Ford preferred to avoid their use if possible.

In this July 1969 report to the Politburo, Soviet ambassador to Washington Anatoly Dobrynin recounts a wide-ranging conversation with national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger a half-year into President Richard M. Nixon’s first term. Dobrynin also offers his candid personal evaluation of Kissinger and the secret White House “backchannel” established by Nixon to circumvent the State Department and communicate directly with the Soviet leadership.