Andropov gives his views on American and Soviet strategy vis-a-vis the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Brezhnev reports on the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party and concludes that there is a misunderstanding of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in North Korea. Brezhnev also mentions a meeting that took place, at Kim Il Sung's request, with the CPSU delegation that was present at the Third Congress.

Condolence letters/telegrams from Leonid Brezhnev, Nikita Krushchev, and Nina Krushcheva to U.S. President L.B. Johnson and Jacqueline Kennedy conveying the sympathy and grief of the Soviet people

These are the records of two meetings on the occasion of the Sixth Interkit Meeting. The first of these involves a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Oleg Rakhmanin, while the second is a meeting with the secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Konstantin Katushev. Both address relations between China and the Soviet Union. The documents discuss the Sino-Soviet border clashes, the Soviet security policy in the Far East and Siberia, and the position of countries such as Yugoslavia, Romania, and Albania, as well as the critical situation in Vietnam and Cambodia.

An excerpt on Cuba from Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev's secret speech, “About Current Problems of the International Situation and the Struggle of the CPSU for the Cohesion of the World Communist Movement,” to the CPSU CC Plenum on 9 April 1968.

Brezhnev discusses Soviet talks with Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Czyrek. Brezhnev also informs the Politburo about the state of the PZPR, the Polish economy, the newly instituted Polish martial law, and the leadership of Jaruzelski.

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

The Politburo approves the results of a meeting of Warsaw Pact officials. Kania offers assurances that PZPR will be able to control the Polish crisis on its own.

Brezhnev summarizes his meeting with E. Honecker regarding the efforts of the PZPR to suppress the rise of antisocialist political opposition forces in Poland. K.V. Rusakov and A.A. Gromyko respond by expressing their worries about the situation in Poland and criticizing the PZPR for not taking decisive measures to restore order and control over the country.

Brezhnev and the Politboro grow frustrated with the Polish leadership. They express fear of the Polish crisis spreading to Belorussia and Georgia, and question the health of Polish leaders.