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July 8, 1961

Record of a Conversation Between N. S. Khrushchev and K. Popovic, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Concerning the Questions of Signing a Peace Treaty with Germany

Khrushchev and Popovic discuss the ongoing tensions surrounding the peace treaty with Germany and the future of West Berlin, with Khrushchev emphasizing the Soviet Union’s readiness to act if negotiations fail. They address the actions of Western powers, particularly the United States and its allies, and the risks of escalation, while acknowledging the importance of diplomacy to avoid conflict. Khrushchev also touches on the Soviet decision to suspend disarmament measures, the broader international situation, and internal developments in both the USSR and Yugoslavia.

August 10, 1959

N.S. Khrushchev’s Views on the Content of a Memorandum [about a Peace Treaty with Germany]

N. S. Khrushchev outlines his perspective on negotiating with the United States regarding a peace treaty with Germany, emphasizing the need to address the division between the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). He critiques Western policies that led to Germany's division and proposes signing a peace treaty with the GDR, while reassuring the U.S. that this action is not a threat to West Berlin. Khrushchev also touches on broader geopolitical issues, such as parallels with divided Korea and Vietnam, the significance of trade as a diplomatic barometer, and the importance of resolving tensions surrounding Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Throughout, he encourages a phased approach to negotiations, stressing mutual understanding to avoid exacerbating international tensions.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

July 14, 1953

Letter from President Eisenhower to Field Marshall Montgomery of Alamein

In a personal letter to the Field Marshall regarding to his assumptions made in a memoranda, President Eisenhower presents an opposing view that the successful integration of West Germany into Western Europe would increase pressure within East Germany for reunification.