As Ambassador El-Kuni bid farewell to Khrushchev, he thanked the Soviet Union for its support of the Arab peoples and the UAR, while Khrushchev expressed hope for continued strong relations, highlighting the Aswan Dam as a lasting symbol of friendship. Khrushchev also privately criticized the UAR's treatment of communists and warned that undemocratic practices could strain relations, while El-Kuni defended the government's actions as necessary for national stability.

Ali Sabri uses the increased pressure that the United States and Israel place on Arab nations to ask Brezhnev for increased military support to Egypt. Brezhnev responds by speaking about the importance that politics plays in negotiations with Israel. He also expresses gratitude for Egypt's diplomatic recognition of the GDR.

While in 1947 the Indian organizers of the First Asian Relations Conference invited a Yishuvi delegation, eight years later the Bandung Conference organizers did not invite Israel. At the same time, the second half of the 1950s signaled the start of Israel’s long “African Decade,” which would end only when many African states cut their diplomatic ties with the Jewish State after the 1973 October War. The first two countries to establish diplomatic ties with Israel were Ethiopia, in 1956, and Liberia, in 1957; in the 1960s, many others followed, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Tanzania.

Thousands of Africans studied in Israel. Moreover, thousands of Israeli engineers, agronomists, architects, geologists and others who had participated in nation-state building in Israel worked often for years in development projects in Africa and also, though less so, in Asia and Latin America. And as Ronen Bergman’s 2007 PhD thesis “Israel and Africa: Military and Intelligence Liaisons” shows, Israel exported weaponry and Israeli officers shared with the militaries of recently decolonized African countries their expertise in warfare and in controlling civilians. After all, Israel blitzed through the Egyptian Sinai in 1956, had won its first war back in 1948-1949, and from then until 1966 kept its own Palestinian citizens under military rule.

In fact, the Israeli Defense Forces and the foreign intelligence agency Mossad were central to Israel’s involvement in Africa. The core reason for Israel’s interest in Africa was political and strategic. Israel needed allies in the United Nations, where postcolonial Asian countries were turning against it. And it wished to minimize the dangers of postcolonial Arab-African alliances and to extend to parts of Africa its “periphery doctrine” of honing relations with Middle Eastern countries that neighbor Arab states, like Iran and Turkey. As it did so, Israel at times shared some contacts and information with the US government; becoming a US asset was a boon to the Israeli government, though it remained fiercely independent-minded.

Hence, we have the text reproduced here: translated English excerpts from a 1962 Arabic-language book that shows how Arab nationalists read Israel’s Africa policy. Moreover, as works like Haim Yacobi’s Israel and Africa: A Genealogy of Moral Geography (2016) and Ayala Levin’s Architecture and Development: Israeli Construction in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Settler Colonial Imagination, 1958-1973 (2022) show, the afore-noted political and strategic imperatives were steeped in well-rooted Zionist aspirations—aspirations that were colonial in type though not name—to be a Western developmentalist pioneer in the world. These aspirations pertained especially to Africa, which, literally bordering Israel, has helped shape Israelis’ view of their place in the world. At the same time, however, Israelis explicitly framed this pioneering self-view within a view of Africans as people who, like the Jews, had recently escaped colonial conditions and reached independent statehood.

This is an English translation of a speech originally given in Arabic in 1958 by Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) and then reprinted in a book published in Cairo.

An officer by training and profession and a participant in the 1952 coup that ended Egypt’s country’s monarchy, Nasser in 1954 became president of Egypt and as such the president of the United Arab Republic (UAR), which was formed with Syria in 1958 and which continued to exist for a decade after Syria left the union in 1961. Having met India’s president Jawahrlal Nehru already in 1954, Nasser began playing an important political role also beyond the Middle East in the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia. His star rose precipitously in 1956, when he nationalized the Suez Canal and when France and Britain had to withdraw their forces from the canal after occupying its northern part in November 1956. Given Egypt’s position in the Middle East and internationally, the US administration was concerned this aggression would play into the hands of its Cold War rival, the Sovet Union. The US forced its NATO allies (and their Israeli colluders) to withdraw—a defeat that Egyptians celebrated as their own anti-imperialist success and that deepened Nasser’s popularity among many Arabs and other decolonizing and postcolonial people.

It was against that background that the Egyptian government further upped its international profile. This now occurred also vis-à-vis Asia and not “only” vis-à-vis Africa, which had been an important arena for the republican regime’s foreign policy from before Bandung. Thus, in 1957 Nasser’s government organized the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference that, analyzed in Reem Abou-el-Fadl’s “Building Egypt’s Afro-Asian Hub” (2019), led to Cairo housing the secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organisation. And in early 1958, it held the Afro-Asian Youth Conference. By this time and in the 1960s, Cairo became a key transnational hub for decolonization movements especially from Africa, as Eric Burton has shown in "Hubs of Decolonization. African Liberation Movements and Eastern Connections in Cairo, Accra and Dar es Salaam" (2019).

The text printed here is Nasser's address to the Afro-Asian Youth Conference, which happened to take place a mere day after the Syrian-Egyptian UAR was formally announced.

On May 3, 1961, Nikita Khrushchev met with a delegation from the United Arab Republic (UAR) led by Anwar Sadat. The meeting began with expressions of gratitude and solidarity, highlighting Soviet support for UAR independence and its struggle against imperialism, particularly in relation to the construction of the Aswan Dam and resistance to Western aggression in the Middle East. Khrushchev emphasized the superiority of socialism and communism, advocating the Soviet model as an example for nations striving for independence and progress. Sadat expressed appreciation for Soviet assistance and raised concerns about the financial burden of purchasing weapons from the USSR. He requested a reduction in the price, citing UAR’s commitments to supporting anti-imperialist struggles across Africa and Asia. Khrushchev acknowledged the UAR’s vital role in the global anti-colonial movement but maintained that the USSR could not lower its weapons prices due to its own economic constraints and the need for consistency in its aid policies. Despite these limitations, Khrushchev promised to explore alternative ways to assist the UAR. The conversation concluded with mutual respect and reaffirmation of Soviet-UAR solidarity.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

Zhou and Bhutto discuss the Second Asian-African Conference, as well as the potential for a rapprochement between China and the Philippines.

This report describes the visit of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin to the United Arab Republic (UAR) during which he reinforced positive relations with President Nasser and the UAR and discussed the Vietnam War, Sino-Soviet tensions, the Arab World, Israel, and economic concerns.

This report by the Hungarian ambassador in Cairo states that the Syrian people are wary toward President Nasser’s creation of the United Arab Republic, fearing he will enforce a dictatorship, however the Syrian communist party is in full support of the union.

The Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi spoke with Nicolae Ceaușescu regarding President Nixon's speech in which he talks about disengaging the US from issues that do not concern the US, but also not abandoning allies. The Shah recalled that he told President Nixon long ago to withdraw from Vietnam. The Arab-Israeli conflict was also discussed.

The document describes the negotiations between Soviet leaders and Nasser, which mainly focused on the conflict in the Middle East and the possible recognition of the GDR by the United Arab Republic. Nasser emphasized that there would be no direct talks between the UAR and Israel, but that the UAR would be willing to take part in a UN negotiated attempt to solve the conflict, upon the condition that Israel withdraw its troops from the occupied territories. Nasser was reluctant to follow the Soviet demand for a diplomatic recognition of the GDR.