Material sent to L. I. Brezhnev in preparation for a private conversation with I. Gandhi. Potential topics for conversation include the Soviet Union's commitment to strengthening India's defense capability, India's role in the non-aligned movement, and recent steps in the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.

Material sent to L. I. Brezhnev in preparation for a general conversation with I. Gandhi. Potential topics for conversation include the importance of Soviet-Indian relations, tensions with the United States, negotiations on nuclear weapons, and events in the Middle East.

Material from P. Kutsobin outlining information reviewed by B. N. Ponomarev to be used in a conversation with I. Gandhi. Topics for the conversation include the dangers of the arms race, Israeli aggression in the Middle East, and Soviet build up in Afghanistan. Special attention is given to how questions related to the Communist Party of India should be addressed. 

This record summarizes the Soviet-Indian talks held between L. I. Brezhnev and Indira Gandhi in September 1982. The record emphasizes India's reliance on Soviet aid for economic and military development.

Discusses the establishment of the Indo-Peruvian Cultural Institute

List of countries visited in South America

A meeting between British Foreign Office and State Department officials on the Indian nuclear problem occurred the same month that Indian Prime Minister Gandhi approved the “final preparations for a PNE.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher T. Van Hollen (the father of the future Maryland Congressman) and his colleagues followed the approach taken by the Special National Intelligence Estimate, which was close to that taken by the British Joint Intelligence Committee. According to country director David Schneider, the “odds were about even” that India would make a decision, but once it was made, India could test very quickly. There was “no firm intelligence” that a “go-ahead signal” to prepare for a test had been made. Schneider reviewed bilateral and multilateral steps, proposed in the NSSM 156 study, that the U.S. and others could take to try to discourage an Indian test and the range of reactions that would be available if India went ahead. A “weak” U.S. reaction, Schneider observed, would suggest that Washington would “acquiesce” if other countries followed India’s example.

U.S. embassy officials report on an interview with Lauren Gray, the chairman of Canada’s Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB), who had recently visited India. Having spoken with Homi Nusserwanji Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and other officials, Gray believed that Sethna opposed a test and that as long as Sethna and Indira Gandhi were in office “there was no chance” that India would test a nuclear device, which would take three to four years to prepare. Other officials with the AECB disagreed with Gray's estimates - based on their assessment of Indian’s ability to produce weapons grade plutonium, they argued that it would take no more than a year to produce a device. They also pointed out that about 18 months earlier there had been a “blackout” of statistical information on plutonium production in India.

A lengthy report on the results of India Gandhi's visit to the Soviet Union drawn from news sources and conversations with Indian officials. The response is described as highly positive with an expectation of closer political and economic cooperation between the two countries in the future.

Minutes of conversation between Aid to the Yugoslav State Secretary Milorad Pesic and Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia Ivan A. Benediktov regarding Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs Marko Nikezic's visit to India to discuss the Middle East crisis. The two leaders also discuss the opening of a direct communications line between Belgrade and Moscow.