Material sent to L. I. Brezhnev in preparation for a private conversation with I. Gandhi. Potential topics for conversation include the Soviet Union's commitment to strengthening India's defense capability, India's role in the non-aligned movement, and recent steps in the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.

Material sent to L. I. Brezhnev in preparation for a general conversation with I. Gandhi. Potential topics for conversation include the importance of Soviet-Indian relations, tensions with the United States, negotiations on nuclear weapons, and events in the Middle East.

Brezhnev and Gandhi discuss India's relationship to Pakistan and Afghanistan, highlighting the Soviet Union's involvement with the two countries. Gandhi also speaks about India's domestic situation and asks Brezhnev to cooperate in increasing India's defense capabilities. Brezhnev tells Gandhi confidential information about recent developments in Soviet-China relations.

This document contains records of three conversations had between L. I. Brezhnev and Fidel Castro during Brezhnev's visit to Cuba. Castro welcomes Brezhnev to Cuba and the two leaders clearly state the friendship felt between their countries. They also speak about the political and economic situations of Cuba and the USSR, Soviet military aid to Cuba, conflict in the Middle East and Africa, and socialist movements in Latin America.

Yasui and Khrushchev talk about the nuclear test ban, the situation in Taiwan, the recognition of the People's Republic of China around the world, and the next 11th Communist Party Congress. 

Proposed text of a letter from Nikita Khrushchev to Mao Zedong, reiterating Soviet support for the People's Republic of China in the event of a nuclear attack on the PRC.

Gromyko discusses negotiations over the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Andrei Gromyko forwards to Premier Khrushchev a political profile, prepared by the USSR Embassy in Washington, of the recently-nominated Democratic presidential candidate, Senator John F. Kennedy.

The following CPSU Central Committee document, dated 1 April 1979 and signed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, KGB chief Yurii Andropov, and CC International Department head Boris Ponomarev, provides a strikingly candid assessment of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan that the Soviet Politburo confronted in spring 1979. The report attributes the increasing success of the Islamic opposition (i.e., the Afghan Mujaheddin) to the “miscalculations and mistakes” of the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) regime that seized power following the April 1978 “revolution.”

Concerns US-Soviet relations, including involvement in Africa, NATO, China, and SALT.