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March 4, 1952

Despatch No. 389 from American Embassy Taipei to the Department of State, 'Recent American Policy Toward Formosa'

This despatch summarizes US policy toward Formosa (Taiwan) as a response to the threat posed by Communist China. The document underscores the United States' commitment to neutralizing Formosa militarily to prevent Communist occupation, its provision of significant economic and military aid to strengthen Formosa's defenses, and its insistence that Formosa's future political status be determined through international consultation rather than unilateral force.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

December 13, 1950

Telegram No. 795 from Taipei to the Secretary of State

In this "eyes only" telegram for Dean Rusk, Rankin highlights concerns about the Chinese Communists' threat to Formosa (Taiwan) amid broader US and international efforts. 

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

July 25, 1965

Record of a Conversation between L. I. Brezhnev and N. Ceausescu and I. G. Maurer on 25 July 1965

Ceausescu emphasizes the importance of repairing Sino-Soviet relations. The two leaders end their conversation by discussing Ceausescu's travel plans for an upcoming visit to the USSR. 

March 30, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1905 to the American Embassy Rome

The State Department instructs the embassies in Ankara and Rome of the importance of avoiding “fallacious comparison between Jupiter dismantling and withdrawal Soviet missiles from Cuba.” To help do that, the embassies should ensure that “no official facilitation will be given press or photo coverage of missile dismantling.” In response to any press queries, the embassies could state that “dismantled missiles will be transported over period several weeks.” To avoid an “air of mystery” around the dismantling, the Department opposed efforts to block media coverage of missiles in transit. The embassies should approach Italian and Turkish officials “along [those] lines.”

March 15, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1772 to the American Embassy Rome

The State Department instructs the Embassy to inform Italian authorities that if the Jupiter dismantling was to be completed within the first 25 days of April, as the Italian government requested, military officials needed to be notified accordingly.  According to the Deputy CINCEUR, Italian military officials had not yet received authorization on the dismantling. The State Department hoped that Italian military personnel would be available for the operation “notwithstanding Easter holidays."

March 11, 1963

Department of State Telegram 820 to the American Embassy Ankara

The Kennedy administration found it necessary to solve the problem raised by Ambassador Hare lest military assistance cuts delay or prevent action to dismantle the Turkish Jupiters. After the Wood mission left Washington, in accordance with NSC 1550 (setting requirements for foreign aid funding decisions), the State Department undid the cuts by authorizing Wood to discuss specific quantities of approved equipment that could be delivered during FY 1963 and quantities and types of equipment that could be provided during FY 1964. For the latter, equipment could be provided up to a level of $150 million (thus providing the modernization resources sought by the Turkish military), but Wood was not to mention any dollar values during the talks.   

March 7, 1963

Department of State Telegram 808 to the American Embassy Ankara

Following up on earlier ideas about direct talks with Turkish officials, General Robert Wood, the director of Military Assistance Programs at the Department of Defense, would be visiting Turkey for talks. This State Department message notes that in light of proposed overall cuts of foreign aid, projected military aid to Turkey would total $120 million, and U.S. officials would emphasize Washington’s “continuing long term interest” in Turkey’s military capabilities. Issues for Hare’s consideration include the “adequacy” of the proposed approach and what needed to be done to bolster Turkish “confidence and morale” and to prevent any “stalling” on the Jupiters.

March 6, 1963

Department of State Telegram 800 to the American Embassy Ankara

The U.S. had hoped that an exchange of notes with Turkey on the Jupiter/Polaris arrangement would facilitate a technical level approach to the Turkish military on the “mechanics of Jupiter dismantling.” But with parliamentary approval of the notes delayed, and not likely to occur until later in the month, the U.S. needed to make an approach on dismantling so that it occurred in conjunction with the arrival of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean. With dismantling scheduled to begin on April 15, the Department would like Hare’s advice on whether a technical approach could be made “without running unacceptable political risk.”

February 28, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1659 to the American Embassy Rome

The State Department sent the embassies in Ankara and Rome the text of a draft note to be used in negotiations with both countries for formal agreements on the removal of the Jupiter missiles and their replacement with Polaris submarines operating in the Mediterranean. The dismantlement of Jupiter sites in Italy would  “begin concurrently with the arrival of the Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean” around April 1, while the dismantling in Turkey would begin with the arrival of the second Polaris submarine on or about April 15.

February 15, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1150 to the American Embassy Paris

To bring NATO officially on board, the State Department sent this draft paper to U.S. ambassadors in Italy, NATO, and Turkey for use with the North Atlantic Council and with SACEUR. Just as the three governments had informed the Council of the Jupiter deployment plans in the late 1950s, they would brief the NAC on the purposes of the Jupiter-Polaris arrangement and its military implications, including retargeting requirements for the “timely damage” of Allied Command Europe targets.

Pagination