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Documents

February 1, 1963

OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense] Telegram 020123Z to Department of State

By late January, the negotiations with Turkey were bogged down, with Defense Minister Sancar asking for a Turkish military presence on the Polaris submarines as well as delivery of nuclear weapons for the F-100 Super Sabres before the Jupiters were replaced. Without a formal agreement on the Jupiters, the U.S. government held back from a decision on another matter: the delivery of F-104G fighter-bombers. Nevertheless, Defense Department officials approved a decision to “provide first available aircraft” in April 1963, which was necessary to authorize the Air Force’s “preliminary preparatory actions.” The U.S. would preserve its “bargaining position” by informing Turkey in writing that an “accelerated delivery date will become firm upon satisfactory conclusion of current US/Turkey negotiations.”

January 29, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1416 to the American Embassy Rome

Responding to Finletter’s request, the State Department provides a statement on the Jupiters for the NAC meeting on January 30, 1963. It explained that the U.S. cannot bring up the matter unilaterally until consultations with Italy and Turkey have progressed. Finletter should coordinate delivery of the statement with Italian and Turkish representatives while Reinhard and Hare work with the Italians and Turks in preparing a written statement that can be presented to the NAC at a later stage. While the Italians were willing to join the statement, it is not clear whether Turkey did or whether the statement was made to the NAC on January 30.

January 24, 1963

Department of State Telegram 634 to American Embassy Ankara

The early delivery of F-104G’s was a crucial element in the negotiations with Turkey over the Jupiters, and the U.S. planning on the deliveries was moving forward. The State Department, however, wanted Turkish authorities to understand that the timing of the deliveries “will depend on such progress in negotiations that it is clear GOT [Government of Turkey] will agree to dismantle JUPITERS.”

January 18, 1963

Department of State Telegram 1250 to the American Embassy Rome

This message, intended “only” for Ambassador Reinhardt, included information for use in backgrounders for officials and journalists, but only with the Department’s consent. It included comparisons of the Jupiter and Polaris missiles, a brief discussion of possible targeting arrangements for Polaris, and the possible timing of the introduction of Polaris and the phase out of Jupiter missiles.  One point concerned “Equating of Italy and Turkey with Cuba.” U.S. officials were advised to make no comment on the matter, but if raised, officials should observe that when the Soviets equated missiles in Cuba with Jupiters in Italy and Turkey “we absolutely refused accept any such comparison or deal.” A version of these points would soon go to Fanfani’s foreign policy adviser, Carlo Marchiori.

Date unknown

Arms Sales Issue

An undated memo produced during the first Reagan administration outlining US law and previous exchanges between the US and the PRC on American arms sales to Taiwan.

February 7, 1955

Memorandum for Mr. Allen Dulles, Director, Central Intelligence Agency

The Department of State shares with the CIA several documents, including a record of conversation between Anthony Eden and a Soviet diplomat in London on February 2, 1955; a record of conversation between Ambassador Hayter and Molotov on February 4; a translation of Molotov's statement made to Hayter; and comments made by Humphrey Trevelyan. 

July 1, 2001

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 'Fact Sheet: Middle East Peace Process Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group'

A Department of State summary of of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group, released during the George W. Bush administration.

April 6, 1979

Cable from the Secretary of State to the American Embassy in Islamabad, 'Contingency Press Guidance: Pakistan Nuclear Problem

This document, sent from the U.S. State Department in Washington D.C. to its embassy in Islamabad, is a collection of questions and answers regarding the Pakistan nuclear program. This "Contingency Press Guidance" is meant to guide diplomatic officials on how to appropriately answer questions posed by the press regarding the Pakistan situation.

March 19, 1979

Memorandum for the President from Cyrus Vance, 'Nuclear Problems in the Sub-Continent: Status Report'

This document is a three-page brief from U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Jimmy Carter regarding Pakistan's nuclear program.

April 1979

Cable from Cyrus Vance, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Problem'

A telegram from U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance concerning the Pakistani nuclear program that was shared with British officials.

Pagination