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Documents

December 10, 1995

State Department Telegram 28705 to US Embassy in India, 'Arrange Wisner-Varma Meeting on Testing Issue'

Telegram instructing the Charges d'Affairs to arrange an urgent meeting between the United States Ambassador to India and the Indian Prime Minister's Pricipal Secretary to discuss American concerns that India will launch a nuclear test. The State Department was ready for a demarche to the Indian government to express “grave concerns” about the possibility of a test.

December 5, 1960

Dispute Over Personnel Policy and Practices Culminates in Resignation of Radio Free Europe Top Management

The Munich Consulate-General provides its appraisal of turmoil in the RFE Czechoslovak Service and the ensuing replacement of the American management at RFE Munich

March 20, 1957

Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy Minutes

Minutes of the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy (CRBP) meeting of that date, attended by State Department, USIA (United States Information Agency), and CIA officials

February 11, 1957

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Additional Proposal concerning the Reappraisal of U.S. Propaganda Broadcasting' [Approved for Release March 2009]

CIA and State Department officials plan an interagency working group including USIA officials to reappraise US international broadcasting [later named the Committee on Radio Broadcasting Policy, CRBP].

July 23, 1986

State Department Cable 229696 to US Embassy France et al., 'Visit of Pakistani Primin Mohammad Khan Junejo to Washington – 15-18 July 1986'

A State Department Cable detailing the visit of Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo to Washington D.C. According to administration officials, Junejo was “astute and well briefed” and professed to be responsive to the U.S. emphasis on the “absolute criticality” of “restraint” in Pakistani nuclear activities. In meetings with the press, Junejo “specifically affirmed” commitment not to enrich uranium above the five percent level.

December 7, 1985

Defense Intelligence Agency cable to [excised location], 'Pakistan-China: Nuclear Weapons Production and Testing'

A State Department telegram discussing the possible Chinese-Pakistani nuclear assistance and reports that Pakistan had acquired a nuclear weapon in October of 1985.

1983

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State, 'Pakistan: Security Planning and the Nuclear Option,' Report 83-AR

A State Department assessment of Pakistan’s security situation, its nuclear program and the future of Pakistani planning. A range of subjects are covered in depth including, Pakistan’s perception of its security situation, major foreign policy dilemmas such as India and Afghanistan, the development of a “nuclear options” and American non-proliferation responses.

December 21, 1973

Joint State/Defense Message, “Questions Regarding Northern Limit Line"

The U.S. Departments of State and Defense analyze North Korea's claims relating to the Northern Limit Line and the origins of the NLL.

December 4, 1973

Joint State/Defense Message, “Korean Northwest Coastal Situation"

The U.S. Departments of Defense and State offer instructions about how to respond to the Northern Limit Line Dispute, including measures to restrain South Korea.

September 21, 1972

Memorandum of Conversation, 'Indian Nuclear Developments'

A meeting between British Foreign Office and State Department officials on the Indian nuclear problem occurred the same month that Indian Prime Minister Gandhi approved the “final preparations for a PNE.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Christopher T. Van Hollen (the father of the future Maryland Congressman) and his colleagues followed the approach taken by the Special National Intelligence Estimate, which was close to that taken by the British Joint Intelligence Committee. According to country director David Schneider, the “odds were about even” that India would make a decision, but once it was made, India could test very quickly. There was “no firm intelligence” that a “go-ahead signal” to prepare for a test had been made. Schneider reviewed bilateral and multilateral steps, proposed in the NSSM 156 study, that the U.S. and others could take to try to discourage an Indian test and the range of reactions that would be available if India went ahead. A “weak” U.S. reaction, Schneider observed, would suggest that Washington would “acquiesce” if other countries followed India’s example.

Pagination