In this meeting between members of the Policy Planning Staff's board of consultants, the participants discussed their policy preferences towards European nuclear arrangements.
Recognizing “bitter” French and Soviet objections to a collective nuclear force, the consultants believed that over time it might be possible to “get both the force and the agreement.”

The telegram notifies the White House reaching an interim agreement with Japan that authorizes Tokai Mura to reprocess fifty more tons of spent fuel to keep the plant operating in exchange of Japan not making any attempts toward establishing a new reprocessing plant before 1 June 1981.

The briefing paper describes the Japanese government's reprocessing ability and desire to build the second reprocessing plant to fuel experimental breeder reactor. The State Department wants to resolve safeguards requirements for reprocessing in Japan but agrees that an interim agreement could be reached.

The telegram shows the State Department requesting the US Embassy in Tokyo to learn more about Japanese thinking on a second reprocessing plant and why Japanese MITI and JAERIA held different views on this issue.

The memorandum describes Ambassador Smith's meeting with Director General Yatabe regarding reprocessing of US origin materials and second reprocessing plant.

Short version of the Presidential Decision Paper for policymakers.

The memorandum describing the discussion on extention of the Tokai-Mura agreement and State Department officials' opinions.

Explorations of common approaches to nonproliferation and engery development issues arising out of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The memorandum describes Japanes Minister of State for Science and Technology emphasizing the significance of a plutonium economy given Japan's energy needs.

The memorandum describes President Carter's comrpomise with Japanese Prime Miniter Fukusa on starting up the Tokai Mura reprocessing plant under one of the State Department's three options.