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June 27, 1961

Record of Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

Pham Van Dong thanks Khrushchev for the Soviet help to Vietnamese people. Khrushchev talks about politics around the world, particularly, in the socialist countries such as Albania and China. He claims that the relationship with China is improving. Khrushchev also mentions that he discussed Indian politics with Mao. He criticizes the politics of Stalin toward China. 

March 26, 1965

Palestine Delegation in Peking

Formed in 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was not the first Palestinian organization after the nakba (catastrophe), the escape from violence and the Israeli expulsion of a good half of Palestinians in 1948. The two most important earlier organizations were Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-‘Arab (Arab Nationalists Movement [ANM]) and Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (Palestinian National Liberation Movement [Fatah]).

Founded in 1951 in Beirut, ANM became committed to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970) and his version of pan-Arab nationalism, which it saw as the means to liberate Palestine, opening a separate Palestinian branch in 1959. (In 1967, it would give rise to the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which split in 1968, one wing forming the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP)).

Rejecting Arab states’ tutelage, Fatah was officially born in 1959, though organizational activities began in 1956 and though it built on military cells operating from Egyptian-ruled Gaza from the early 1950s. After Arab armies’ crushing loss against Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967 killed any remaining hopes, weakened since the early 1960s, that Arab armies would liberate Palestine, Fatah grew in strength. In 1969, it took command of the PLO. The latter had been founded in 1964 for several reasons. Nasser hoped to weaken Fatah and Syria, a state then in competition with him. Also, the PLO served (upper) middle class Palestinians some of whom—like Ahmad al-Shuqayri (1908-1908), Palestine’s representative to the Arab League and the PLO’s founder and first chairman—had played a Palestinian political role until 1948 and wished to do so again. And these men and women believed Palestinians needed their own statist entity, as Yezid Sayigh’s monumental Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (1997) notes.

In 1965, PLO delegates led by Shuqayri for the first time visited the People’s Republic of China (PRC), as reported in the English issue of the multi-language international organ Peking Review. Already in 1964 a small Fatah delegation led by Yassir Arafat (1929-2004) had accepted an invitation to visit Beijing, founding an office there. Sure, upon its establishment in 1949 the PRC had de jure recognized Israel, following the lead of the Soviet Union that acted as its older brother in the communist camp. (Israel in turn was the first Middle Eastern state to recognize the PRC, in 1950.) But after the PRC and the USSR split in 1960, Beijing amplified its anti-imperialist rhetoric and policies versus the Soviet Union and the United States, as Gregg Brazinksy’s Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War (2017) has shown. It was in this context that it from the mid-1960s delivered arms especially to Fatah and the PLO—it soon also would train fighters—and that it politically embraced the Palestinian cause. The PRC framed this policy as that of one “revolutionary people” helping another one, a story strand in Paul Chamberlin’s The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order (2012). By the early 1970s, however, Chinese support became more lukewarm. Moreover, after the death of Chairman Mao Zedong (1893-1976), relations with Israel cautiously warmed, though remaining surreptitious until the establishment of full diplomatic ties in 1992.

November 14, 1954

Jawaharlal Nehru, 'Note on Visit to China and Indo-China'

Nehru gives a detailed report on his visit to China and Indo-China. He first gives a summary of the issues and topics he covered in discussions in China with Zhou En-Lai and Mao, which covered a broad range of subjects including China's Five Year Plan, and various foreign policy issues. Nehru then describes his visit to Indochina, where he speaks with Ho Chi Minh (five days after he takes control of Hanoi) in North Vietnam, and also tours South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

February 27, 1972

Joint Communique between the United States and China

The United States and China pledge to improve relations with one another in the famous "Shanghai Communique."

July 22, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, Regarding the final plenary session of the conference (excerpt)

In this telegram Zhou Enlai writes to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, regarding the final plenary session of the conference. "The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia" was signed on July 21 and Zhou met with the participating delegations, and celebrated with the delegations from Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China.

July 3, 1954

Main points, Zhou Enlai's presentations at the Liuzhou Conference (excerpt)

A summary of the main points of Zhou Enlai's presentations given at the Liuzhou Conference July 3-5. Zhou touches on the topic of crucial questions the communist parties are facing, Korea and US intervention, and conditions for armistice.

June 15, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Regarding the Thirteenth Restricted Session

Zhou Enlai writes to Chairman Mao, Comrade Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee about the thirteenth restricted session of the Geneva Conference. During this session Molotov put forward a twelve-point proposal concerning the joint committee, the supervision committee by countries of neutrality, and the question of international guaranty.

June 15, 1954

Summary, Zhou Enlai's presentation at a meeting of the Chinese, Soviet, and Vietnamese delegations

Zhou Enlai states that under the current situation the communist side should make concessions on the Laos and Cambodia questions so that the conference will continue. Additionally he sees the key issue in the negotiation now is whether to acknowledge that there are Vietnamese troops in the two countries.

June 8, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee (excerpt)

Zhou Enlai writes to to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee to inform them that the "big adjustment" plan of dividing Vietnam and drawing borders is most favorable to them. He cautions that the other plans are not favorable and that some small concessions might have to be made in order to avoid other less favorable plans.

May 30, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, (excerpt)

Zhou Enlai highlights the main problems with the Communist negotiation strategy, which lies in lack of proper understanding of the complexity of the Indochina question. He also stresses that both sides need to discuss "three key issues, namely, dividing zones, ceasefire supervision and international guarantee."

Pagination