At this session of the Presidium, Mikoyan argues that in the face of a universal demand for troop withdrawal the best option is to support the Hungarian government. Mikoyan promotes negotiations over force. The other members support the application of force to put down the uprising. Supporters of force refer to the necessity of keeping Hungary within the Soviet sphere and preventing the uprising from spreading to other Eastern European nations.

The CPSU CC Presidium is confronted with reports from Hungary of mass demonstrations, armed counterrevolutionary groups, and the support for Nagy by the opposition. The CC is told about the Hungarian decision to declare neutrality and the likely confrontation between Soviet and Hungarian troops should the former continue to advance toward Budapest. Also discussed is the split within the HWP and possible Soviet responses.

Debate occurs at this CC session between Molotov, who opposes approving the appeal written by the Provisional CC of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party, and the other members of the CC who desire approving the document. Molotov is concerned about the unknown composition of the CC of the HSWP, the condemnations of former Hungarian Worker’s Party (HWP) politicians, the issue of renaming the HWP, and the risk that Hungary will become the next Yugoslavia. Khrushchev states that Molotov is “clung to the cult of Stalin” and that Molotov is considering bringing back Rakosi and Hegedus.

These notes (part of the Malin Collection) describe Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej’s decision to negotiate with Yugoslavia regarding the fate of Imre Nagy after his arrest and transfer to Romania. The notes state that negotiations are inadvisable and remain the responsibility of Hungary. A second section of the document refers to instructions to the KGB for discrediting Nagy.

KGB Chief Kryuchkov reports that research into Soviet repression in the 1930’s through 1950’s reveals that Imre Nagy willingly worked for the NKVD as an informant. Using the pseudonym “Volodya,” Nagy information is said to have led to sentences for Hungarian émigrés. Kryuchkov states that the documents should be shown to the Secretary General of the HSWP and possibly used in response to calls for Nagy’s rehabilitation.

Letter from Beria to Malenkov, 1 July 1953, taking blame for his inappropriate actions.

Hungarian Secret Police memorandum, “Ensuring the security of preparations for the burial of Imre Nagy and his associates [on 16 June 1989]”, regarding plans to maintain security using the dissemination of information concerning possible retaliation for extremist action, and the use of operatives

Khrushchev describes the events of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the crisis in Poland. He recounts the CPSU's consultations with other communist parties in the socialist camp to determine their attitude toward Soviet intervention, particularly in Hungary. Leaders from China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet position, but Polish leaders opposed the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Khrushchev reports that following these meetings, the CPSU CC Presidium decided to prepare for an attack on the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. He then reads aloud an open letter which declares the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government. He gives details about the suppression of the counterrevolution by Soviet armed forces and the positive reaction of the socialist countries. He states that the lessons of the counterrevolution are to improve relations with the fraternal parties and the socialist countries and to treat them with respect; to improve political work among students and the masses so that they are not mislead by counterrevolutionaries; and to strengthen the Soviet Army.

Kadar argues that the source of mistakes in the past resulted from the monopoly that a handful of Hungarians had on relations with the Soviet Union. Rakosi is singled out as a source for previous difficulties. Kadar believes that forming a new revolutionary government is the only way to undermine the violence of the counterrevolution and prevent Nagy from acting as cover for such activities. To garner support amongst workers, Kadar argues that the new government must not be a Soviet puppet.