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Chiang, Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) China--Foreign relations Clear All

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Chiang Kai-shek

Chiang, Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)

1887 - 1975

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Presidential Office Building of Taiwan

East Asia

Taiwan

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Representatives from Taiwan at the United Nations, September 1971

Taiwan's International Status

Japan's Itsukushima Shrine

East Asia

Japan

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893 - 1976

Portrait of Chiang Ching-kuo

Chiang, Ching-kuo (Jiang Jingguo)

1910 - 1988

Taiwan Strait Crises

Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898 - 1976

Sino-Soviet Relations

Sino-American Confrontation, 1949-1971

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879 - 1953

Conversations with Mao Zedong

Conversations with Zhou Enlai

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China. Communist Party. Central Committee (CCP CC)

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Western Europe

Great Britain

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Documents

April 17, 1951	Telegram No. 209 from Taipei to the Department of State, 'Political Report on Nationalist China - March 1951' This telegram highlights improving morale on Formosa driven by increased US military and economic support and Communist purges on the mainland, which deepened anti-Communist sentiment. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
March 26, 1951	Telegram No. 177 from Taipei to the Department of State, 'Political Report on Formosa, October 11-December 31, 1950' Key themes include growing confidence in American support following the Korean War, rising optimism among the Nationalist Chinese regarding a return to the mainland, increased pro-American sentiment among Formosans, and concerns over Chinese Communist aggression while highlighting internal reforms and local elections. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
March 16, 1959	Telegram No. 1015 from Taipei to the Secretary of State Clarifies that Vice President Chen Cheng's remarks reaffirm the Government of the Republic of China's (GRC) strategy of prioritizing political methods over military force to recover the mainland.
February 3, 1955	Despatch No. 382 from American Embassy Taipei to the Department of State, 'General Report on Formosan Conditions' This despatch provides an analysis of Taiwan's political and social situation through insights gathered from officials, military officers, and intellectuals. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
November 18, 1958	Despatch No. 225 from American Embassy Taipei to the Department of State, 'KMT Doctrinal Adjustment to Modification of GRC Position on "Counterattack"' The document addresses the Kuomintang's (KMT) ideological adjustments regarding its longstanding policy of counterattacking mainland China. It highlights a shift in rhetoric, de-emphasizing immediate military action in favor of political strategies and the notion of revolutionary war led by popular support within the mainland. This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.
November 1967	Statement of Nakajima Kenzo, Chairman of the Board, Opposing the Visit of Prime Minister Sato to the United States and Protesting the Coming to Japan of Chiang Ching-kuo Nakajima Kenzo, a leading figure in the Japan China Cultural Exchange Association, denounces the impending visit of Chiang Ching-kuo to Japan.
March 27, 1952	National Intelligence Estimate Number 27/1, 'Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Taiwan through 1952' The CIA predicts that, as long as US support to Taiwan remains constant, the PRC cannot stage a successful attack on the island.
March 16, 1955	National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-55, 'Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan' The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.
February 4, 1957	Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Planning for Possible Acceptance by Chiang Kai-shek of Chinese Communist Offers to be Vice Premier' Analysts at the CIA assess whether Chiang Kai-shek would agree to become a Vice Premier for the People's Republic of China, following Zhou Enlai's offer to that effect.
August 27, 1957	Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China' Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."