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April 17, 1951

Telegram No. 209 from Taipei to the Department of State, 'Political Report on Nationalist China - March 1951'

This telegram highlights improving morale on Formosa driven by increased US military and economic support and Communist purges on the mainland, which deepened anti-Communist sentiment.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

September 7, 1950

Telegram No. 352 from Taipei to the Secretary of State

The document discusses the Chinese Nationalist government's concerns regarding a potential United Nations investigation into allegations of US aggression in Formosa. Foreign Minister George Yeh emphasized the destabilizing impact such an investigation could have on public and military morale while proposing that the UN simultaneously investigate Chinese Nationalist accusations of Soviet aggression against China​

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

February 15, 1951

Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa, for the Period Ending 15th February, 1951

The Indian Mission in Lhasa reports on the Chinese military encroachment into Tibet, Sino-Tibetan relations and Indo-Tibetan relations, and domestic political and economic developments within Tibet.

October 2, 1957

Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach]

Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

October 19, 1964

J.S. Mehta, 'China's Bomb and Its Consequences on her Nuclear and Political Strategy'

Analysis of the recent Chinese nuclear weapon test and it's strategic implications for China's diplomatic and military policies.

November 24, 1964

K.R. Narayanan, 'India and the Chinese Bomb'

K.R. Narayanan, Director of China Division at Ministry of External Affairs, writes that the explosion of the first nuclear bomb by China will alter the political balance of Asia and the world and development of nuclear weapons by India can be justified and beneficial for the country and the international system as well.

August 10, 1945

Record of a Meeting Between T.V. Soong and Stalin

T.V. Soong, Stalin, and others discuss the status of the war with Japan, the borders of Inner and Outer Mongolia, and the right of Soviet use of Manchurian railroads.

July 10, 1945

Cable, Summary of Averell Harriman Meeting with T. V. Soong

Harriman reports that Soong and Stalin have come to an agreement over the issue of Outer Mongolia, and that China will recognize Outer Mongolia's independence in light of Stalin's proposed Treaty of Alliance between the two nations. Border disputes over Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang remain, as well as the issue of a joint Sino-Soviet railway and the administration of Port Arthur and Dairen.

July 9, 1945

Record of a Meeting Between T. V. Soong and Stalin

Dr. Soong reports Chiang Kai-Shek's response to the stalemate on the question of Outer Mongolia to Stalin and Molotov. Chiang insists on preserving the territorial integrity of China vis a vis Outer Mongolia and Manchuria, and that China's sovereignty in Manchuria should be reinforced by Chinese administration of Port Arthur and Dairen. Stalin asks to think over his decision before responding to Chiang.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

Pagination