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September 27, 2022

Interview with Patricia Lewis

In this interview, Patricia Lewis shares insights from her extensive career in nuclear policy and disarmament, highlighting her transition from nuclear physics to think tank and research work. She explains the risks nuclear weapons pose, not only as physical entities but also as symbols of power that disrupt global politics. Lewis advocates for a focus on risk reduction over immediate disarmament, emphasizing that reducing the chance of nuclear weapon use is the most urgent priority. She discusses the need for broader public awareness and cooperation among governments, think tanks, and civil society to address nuclear issues through a humanitarian lens.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

August 13, 1991

Cable No. 3008 from Ambassador Hashimoto Hiroshi (China) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'The Prime Minister’s Visit to China (Meeting With General Secretary Jiang Zemin) (2 of 2)'

Kaifu and Jiang discuss Sino-Japanese relations, arms transfers, and China's accession to the NPT.

August 12, 1991

Cable No. 3000 from Ambassador Hashimoto Hiroshi (China) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 'The Prime Minister’s Visit to China and Mongolia (Meeting of the Japanese and Chinese Foreign Ministers)'

Nakayama Taro and Qian Qichen discuss Taiwan's participation in APEC, arms control, China's accession to the NPT, Sino-Japanese political and economic relations, and Chinese fishing vessels operating in Japan's territorial waters.

August 11, 1991

Japan-China Summit Meeting (Outline) (Confidential)

Li Peng and Kaifu Toshiki discuss Sino-Japanese relations, a possible visit to China by the Emperor of Japan, Taiwan, North Korea, arms control, Cambodia, Mongolia, Hong Kong, and the environment.

August 10, 1991

Japan-China Summit Meeting (Arms Control and Disarmament)

Li Peng and Kaifu Toshiki discuss China's accession to the NPT, the sale of conventional arms, and North Korea's proposal for the Korean Peninsula to be declared a nuclear-free zone.

October 2, 1957

Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach]

Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

August 2, 1963

Antonín Gregor, 'Explanatory Memorandum [on the Limited Test Ban Treaty]'

A report produced by the Czechoslovak foreign ministry in August 1963 recommending the ratification of Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).  One of the key goals of early Czechoslovak engagement in the ENDC was to reject a nuclear test ban, based on their rejection of any verification measures. However, once the Soviets agreed to the LTBT with the US and the United Kingdom, the Czechoslovak foreign ministry praised the agreement and attacked those (such as China) who resisted the measure. One interesting aspect of the treaty was the proposed role of depositary powers. The document indicates that the Soviets were interested in being a depositary power to the LTBT in order to prevent ratification by governments not recognized by the USSR, most notably West Germany and the Republic of China. The issue of depositary powers reappeared later on, in the NPT as well.

October 1967

Alva Myrdal, 'New Roads to Disarmament'

The author of “New Roads to Disarmament," Alva Myrdal was head of Swedish disarmament policy from 1962 to 1973. In her 1967 paper presented at the Institute of International Affairs in Warsaw, Belgrade, and Zagreb in 1967, Myrdal positions nuclear disarmament in its broader context and elaborates on her visions of a new world order. She would publicize many of these same thoughts and observations in her 1976 book, The Game of Disarmament. How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race. In 1982, she received the Nobel Peace Prize for her work on disarmament.

September 4, 1969

Record of Meeting between Minister Aichi and Premier Kosygin

Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi and Soviet Premier Kosygin discuss bilateral relations, disputed territories, the legacies of World War II, China, and the NPT.

March 23, 1979

Cabinet Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: Pressures and Inducements'

This report, created in March 1979 by the Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, explores the state of Pakistan’s nuclear program. The document also explores topics like Pakistan’s political status among its neighbors in the Arab world, as well as possible ways Pakistan could be induced to terminate its nuclear activities.

In the face of alarmists such as Arthur Hummel in the US and Anthony Parsons in the UK, the influential British analysts on the Ministerial Group on Nuclear Non-proliferation thought it unlikely that Arab countries would knowingly fund Pakistan's nuclear programme, even though it was suggested many Muslim states might welcome a co-religionist achieving the ‘ultimate technological feat’. For nations such as Saudi Arabia, relations with the West were situated as far more significant than connections with Islamabad, despite Pakistan's position as a bulwark between the Muslim world and the USSR. The group suggested enlisting Arab governments in order to put pan-Islamic pressure on Pakistan, arguing that security concerns related to India – and not a desire to equip the Muslim world with a ‘nuclear sword’ – were the nuclear programme's main drivers. Addressing Islamabad’s security issues – a constant in British and American discussions about Pakistan – represented the surest way of achieving positive results. Where the pan-Islamic issue might come into play – analysts suggested – was after any Pakistani nuclear test, where Islamabad might enlist Muslim countries to help resist Western pressure to give up ‘the first nuclear weapon to be developed in a Moslem country.'

Pagination