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November 30, 1965

Transcript of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Jean Chauvel

Premier Zhou and a representative from the French foreign ministry, Jean Chauvel, talk about the Vietnam War. Zhou voices China's support for Vietnamese people's requests for U.S. troops to withdraw from Vietnam and not interfere in Vietnamese internal issues. Zhou says that the U.S. has not comply to Vietnam's request and has on the contrary expanded the war. Chauvel agrees with Zhou that the final decision about the Vietnamese War should be made by Vietnamese people. Chauvel says that the priority should be to stop the current war and calls for a ceasefire to solve the issue. Zhou cites the U.S. expansion of troops and continued involvement in Vietnam as the cause of heightened tension in Vietnam War.

April 17, 1954

Telegram, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng and Su Yu

Telegram in which Mao Zedong instructs Huang Kecheng and Su Yu on how to proceed if an armistice is reached in Vietnam.

June 19, 1975

Cable from Ambassador Pauls to the Foreign Office, 'German-Chinese Relations'

A cable from Ambassador Pauls about a conversation with Chinese Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua about developments in Europe and the Chinese assessment of the global situation after the end of the Vietnam War.

May 31, 1963

Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 7353]

Report from Polish official in Saigon, Maneli, to Warsaw, on his meeting with Pham Van Dong. Dong describes plans for South Vietnam's future government and neutrality, along with North Vietnam's compliance with the Geneva Accords. Reports that Soviet Ambassador Tovmassian was surprised at the high degree of Chinese participation in Vietnam.

May 29, 1963

Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 7237]

Cable from a Polish official in Saigan, Maneli, to Warsaw. detailing talks with Vietnamese officials and the Soviet ambassador. They discuss the investigations of the ICC, and the importance of probes into the Vietnamese situation. The Soviet ambassador notes that Soviet-Vietnamese relations have shifted.

March 15, 1963

Secret Telegram from Ogrodziński (New Delhi) to Wierna (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 3359]

Polish cable from Ogrodzinski in India to Wierna in Warsaw, noting that the Americans would like to replace Ngo Dinh Diem, but do not have a replacement. Notes that Nehru would be willing to pull out of Vietnam. Concludes that neither Diem nor the Americans can independently seek ceasefire without cost to the other.

March 11, 1963

Secret Telegram from Maneli (Hanoi) to Spasowski-Morski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 3175]

Cable from Polish Ambassador in Hanoi Maneli to Warsaw, describing a conversation he had with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and Soviet Ambassador Tovmassian. They discuss the idea of neutralization in Vietnam, and the possibility of the United States pulling forces out. Tovmassian adds that the PRC pressured the DRV to start incidents in the demilitarized zone.

May 13, 1975

Record of Conversation between French President Giscard d'Estaing and Vice Premier of the People's Republic Deng Xiaoping: First Meeting

French President Giscard and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping discuss the current international situation, including the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States and issues of European unity and security. They also discuss the current situation in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos following the fall of Saigon and the end of the Vietnam War.

November 9, 1964

Record of Conversation between Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomułka and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Moscow

Zhou Enlai and Gomulka discuss the Sino-Soviet split following Khrushchev's removal as well as Poland's involvement in maintaining peace in Vietnam.

September 7, 1969

Minutes of Conversation between Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Paul Niculescu Mizil, Zhou Enlai, and Li Xiannian on 7 September 1969

Conversation between Romanian and Chinese representatives. Romanians note that Nixon seemed sincere in his desire to normalize relations with China, and that he believed the Vietnam issue could not be solved militarily. The Romanians believe that Vietnam should pursue the opportunity for talks. Zhou Enlai states that the widespread activity of the USSR proves that the Soviet leaders are "crazy." The Romanians affirm that they would encourage neither the USSR or China to heighten aggression with the other.

Pagination