On October 1, 1962, N.S. Khrushchev met with a delegation from India’s Gandhi Peace Foundation to discuss nuclear disarmament and ongoing arms negotiations. The delegation presented concerns about nuclear testing and urged the Soviet Union to take unilateral steps toward disarmament. Khrushchev responded that while the USSR was willing to sign an agreement to halt nuclear testing, the United States' refusal to accept verification measures and continued military expansion made such an agreement difficult. The conversation also covered US foreign policy, Soviet-Indian relations, and global security issues.

In this March 1978 conversation, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski discussed rising US concerns over Soviet and Cuban military involvement in the Horn of Africa, particularly its perceived threat to Western oil routes and the stability of Saudi Arabia. Dobrynin rejected Brzezinski’s fears as exaggerated, reiterating that the conflict stemmed from Somali aggression and emphasizing that the Soviet presence supported Ethiopia's defense. The meeting ended with both sides restating their entrenched positions, with the US seeking assurances of de-escalation and Soviet withdrawal, which Dobrynin declined to provide.

Commander of the 51st Missile Division General-Major Igor Demyanovich Statsenko's detailed postmortem on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba in mid-1962 and their removal later that year following the nuclear confrontation with the United States. The report includes an attachment titled: "Some Questions of Operational and Tactical Concealment during the Operation of the Division on the Island of Cuba."

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 3 July 1991 describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Iraq, Israel, Peru, China, and Cuba.

Kudryavtsev informs Fidel Castro of the results of the Yugoslav State Secretary for Foreign Affairs' visit in Moscow.

Kudryavtsev and Fidel Castro discuss several points of business, including Kennedy and Krushchev's conversation at their Vienna meeting, the US invasion of Cuba, Yuri Gagarin's trip to Cuba, and the visit of two Cuban Majors to the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

Kudryavtsev delivers the text of Khrushchev's reply to Kennedy's April 18 message, and Dorticos and Fidel Castro praise the text of the message and Soviet support for Cuba. Kudryavstev infroms Castro of the granting of the Cuban governments request for various military equipment, including aircraft and specialists, from the Soviet Union.

At a screening of the film "Two Hours in the USSR," Kudryavtsev informs Fidel Castro that after analyzing the remnants of the US rockets handed over to the Soviets by the Cubans, Soviet scientists have determined that Soviet rocket technology is superior to that of the Us.

Kudryavtsev and Castro discuss diplomatic normalization between the USSR and Ecuador and a CPSU CC letter directed at restoring global unity of the Communist movement, and a report from Inchaustegui suggests renewed US attacks against Cuba.