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August 10, 1973

Intelligence Note, Polish Embassy in Bucharest, 'Regarding Soviet-Romanian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance'

The Polish Embassy in Romania reports on the changed text to the updated Soviet-Romanaian treaty. The main differences were the exclusion of references to West Germany, the Warsaw Pact, and obligations of mutual military assistance.

September 2, 1972

Cryptogram No 9517 from Polish Embassy in Bucharest, Romania Moves Closer to the Soviet Union and the Socialist Countries

The Polish Embassy in Bucharest reports on improved relations between Romania and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, motivated in part by economic reasons.

February 1, 1972

Cryptogram No 1144 from Polish Embassy in Bucharest, Romania Strengthening Relations with the Soviet Union

The Polish Embassy in Romania reports on signs that Romania is serious about improving relations with the Soviet Union, including signing agreements to join Comecon and put the Romanian army under joint command of the Warsaw Pact.

November 6, 1971

Polish Embassy in Bucharest, 'Memorandum Regarding Romania's Relations with the European Socialist Countries After Ceaușescu's Visit to Beijing'

The Polish Ambassador reports that Ceausescu's visit to China had chilled relations with the countries of the Warsaw Pact. The report then discusses Romanians relations with the Soviet Union and Hungary in more depth.

January 11, 1971

Report, Polish Embassy in Bucharest, 'Romania After the Agreements on Friendship with the Soviet Union, Poland and Bulgaria'

The Polish Embassy in Romania reports on trends in Romanian foreign relations. There are signs of rapprochement with the other socialist countries in the Warsaw Pact after Romania reversed course to join Comecon. Yet Ceaușescu continued to court China and the United States as well.

July 14, 1970

Cryptogram No 7067 from Polish Embassy in Moscow, Wording of Soviet-Romanian Agreement

The Polish Embassy in Moscow reports about changes to the wording of a Soviet-Romanian agreement, which "lacks wording referring to the obligations of the parties to take steps to defend the gains of the socialist economic integration, expansion of direct cooperation between the state and social organizations / and of course the problem of Munich."

August 28, 1968

Cryptogram No 10456 from Polish Embassy in Bucharest, Ambassador Ochęduszko's Meeting with the Soviet Ambassador

Polish Ambassador Ochęduszko reports on a conversation with the Soviet ambassador in Bucharest, Alexander Vasilievich Basov. Basov informed him about a conversation he had with Nicolae Ceaușescu on August 25 in which Basov complained about Romanian press which criticized the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Ceausescu continued to insist that military intervention was a mistake.

March 24, 1954

Telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China requests information on two Chinese citizens, Li Qingdong and Shu Fengkui, who had lived in the Soviet Union for a time and claimed to be CPSU members.

June 4, 1946

Memorandum of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to China A.A. Petrov with Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Shijie, 1 June 1946

Wang Shijie presented a draft of suggestions from the Chinese side about economic collaboration in Manchuria, as a proposal. This includes common mine excavations and the Chinese right to use Japanese enterprises in the former occupied Manchuria until the disagreement over the distribution of enemy property confiscated during the war was settled.

February 1985

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'The Libyan Nuclear Program: A Technical Perspective'

For years, U.S. intelligence agencies did not take seriously Muammar Gaddafi’s efforts to develop a Libyan nuclear capability and this report provides early evidence of the perspective that the Libyan program “did not know what it was doing.” According to the CIA, the program’s “serious deficiencies,” including “poor leadership” and lack of both “coherent planning” and trained personnel made it “highly unlikely the Libyans will achieve a nuclear weapons capability within the next 10 years.” The Libyan effort was in such a “rudimentary stage” that they were trying to acquire any technology that would be relevant to producing plutonium or enriched uranium.

Pagination