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Documents

April 2, 1963

Report from General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov to Marshal of the Soviet Union Cde. N.I. Krylov

General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov reflects on Operation Anadyr’, including what lessons the Soviet military can draw from the episode and how the personnel involved in the shipment of missiles to Cuba should now be treated.

August 23, 1963

Report from General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov to the Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff

General-Lieutenant of Aviation Lovkov writes that the "experience of the shipments of the Missile Forces by sea in the summer of 1962" to Cuba will be useful in completing a new manual on transporting missiles over water.

December 1962

Report of the Commander of the 51st Missile Division concerning the Operations of the Division during the Period from 12 July through 1 December 1962

Commander of the 51st Missile Division General-Major Igor Demyanovich Statsenko's detailed postmortem on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba in mid-1962 and their removal later that year following the nuclear confrontation with the United States. The report includes an attachment titled: "Some Questions of Operational and Tactical Concealment during the Operation of the Division on the Island of Cuba."

December 18, 1962

Letter, General-Major Igor Demyanovich Statsenko, Commander of the 51st Missile Division, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Missile Forces, Moscow

A cover letter from Statsenko indicating that he is submitting copies of his detailed reports on the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba in mid-1962 and their removal later that year.

January 16, 1963

Memorandum to the Secretary of State [Dean Rusk] from McGeorge Bundy

During the luncheon for Fanfani, Bundy sent Rusk this short memo about the Fanfani-Kennedy conversation, noting the former’s concern that removing the Jupiters could lead to attacks from the right about “softness toward left-wingers who want the missiles out.” When Kennedy spoke with McNamara after the meeting, he asked him to emphasize to Fanfani the military advantages of replacing the Jupiters with Polaris. McNamara wanted to emphasize that very point to offset any talk of a “nefarious Cuban bargain” with the Soviets. Bundy also highlighted the debate between George Ball and McNamara over whether Jupiters and Polaris should be mentioned in the communique on the Fanfani-Kennedy discussions.

January 16, 1963

Diary Entry of Amintore Fanfani for 16 January 1963

Fanfani covered the events of the day in this journal entry, noting that he told Kennedy he would make no commitment on the Jupiter-Polaris replacement until he spoke with McNamara. With McNamara, Fanfani emphasized the point about using the Jupiter base for space launches. Both Kennedy and McNamara denied that there was a trade with the USSR, with McNamara emphasizing the risks posed by the Jupiters during the Missile Crisis.

November 9, 1962

Memorandum from William R. Tyler to the Secretary [Dean Rusk] through U. Alexis Johnson, 'Turkish and Italian IRBM's'

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

Date unknown

The Soviet Union Needs You! Support Unilateral Disarmament!

This leaflet produced by Youth for Multilateral Disarmament suggests that the policy of the UK divesting itself of nuclear weapons - called 'one-sided disarmament' in the leaflet - would serve Soviet interests and weaken Britain. 

Date unknown

30 Questions and Answers about CND [Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament]

Pamphlet produced by CND to explain the organisation and the causes for which it was campaigning.

October 1, 1983

Photo of Rally in Moscow against the Deployment of Cruise and Pershing Missiles in Western Europe, 1 October 1983 (#3)

This photo was sent to the CND by the Soviet Peace Committee.

Pagination