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November 2, 1962

Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union, Information on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the defense department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College

Further information from the Chinese Embassy to the Soviet Union on the report delivered by Maj. Boris Gelibusiji from the Defense Department of the Soviet Union in the Moscow Engineering and Physics College, describing comments he made on the Sino-Indian border conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

November 6, 1962

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Instruction on How to Express Positions Regarding the Cuba-Soviet Relationship'

Instructions from the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the Embassy in Cuba instructing them to indicate their support for Fidel Castro's November 1st speech, but advising "with respect to the Cuban-Soviet relationship, [you] should not speak but listen [zhiting bushuo]."

November 16, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Havana, 16 November 1962

The conversation takes place soon after the IL-28 crisis, which gives Mikoyan a chance to patch up the relationship with trade agreements and promises of future aid and industrial cooperation. Near the end of the conversation, Guevara and Mikoyan discuss the theory of revolutionary struggle. Guevara shares his vision that “further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries.” Mikoyan cautions him, pointing to the Soviet experience and using the metaphor of the rebellion on the battleship “Potemkin.” Hinting at further disagreement ahead, he gently registers his disagreement with the Cuban leader’s drive to ignite revolution in the hemisphere.

November 13, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana

The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

November 11, 1962

Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

September 8, 1966

CIA Submittal to 303 Committee, Reaffirmation of Existing Policy on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty

CIA proposes adoption of the findings of the Panel on US Government Broadcasting to the Communist Bloc pertaining to RFE and RL but urges continued solicitation of private corporate donations by the RFE Fund [successor to the Crusade for Freedom]

April 28, 1966

Report of the Panel on US Government Radio Broadcasting to the Communist Bloc

Panel commissioned by the White House and comprised of Zbigniew Brzezinski, William E. Griffith, John S. Hays, and Richard S. Salant recommends continuation of RFE and RL as covertly funded objective news services, along with VOA and RIAS, discontinuation of public solicitation of private financial donations to RFE, and (Hays dissenting) establishing a Radio Free China

November 16, 1956

Proposed Interim Policy Guidance for Free Europe Committee, Second Draft

Second draft of “Proposed Interim Guidance for FEC” prepared for Allen Dulles to forward [over his disclosed pseudonym] to the FEC.

December 3, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 71

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”

November 16, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 66

Protocol 66 is the first Malin note dated after the Cuban Missile Crisis, on 11 November. The tone of the protocol indicates that Castro is not pleased with Khrushchev's handling of the crisis, and there is a growing sense of distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Pagination