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Documents

May 10, 1960

Record of Conversation: Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N.S. Khrushchev with the Minister of Farming and Forestry of Japan T. Fukuda and Chairman of the Association of Fisheries T. Takasaki May 10, 1960

The leaders discuss possibilities to improve the Soviet-Japanese relations. The Japanese delegation inquires about the permission for Japanese fishermen to use the Soviet fishing grounds and a chance to establish aerial communication between Japan and the Soviet Union. Khrushchev affirms the Soviet-Japanese friendship and expresses willingness to conduct trade. 

January 25, 1960

N.S. Khrushchev’s Note on a Memorandum to Japan

Khrushchev offers further corrections for a memorandum to Japan. 

January 24, 1960

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s Note on a Memorandum to Japan

Khrushchev suggests to not frame America as an aggressor and offers to focus on the issue of Japanese national independence. He announces that Japan can only return to the Japanese with the departure of foreign troops

August 5, 1957

Record of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Vice President of the “Japan-USSR” Friendship Society Kazami Akira

Kazami and Khrushchev discuss the development of Soviet-Japanese relations and Japanese independence. Kazami inquires about the possible participation of Japanese specialist in the industrial development of Siberia. He also asks about the potential transfer of the Kuril Islands to Japan. 

September 16, 1991

Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany, September 16, 1991, 1:30-2:30pm

This memorandum documents a broader meeting involving senior U.S. and German officials, addressing global challenges and German-American relations. Chancellor Kohl highlighted Germany's domestic recovery post-reunification, acknowledging difficulties in the former East German states and economic adjustments. He praised U.S. leadership in the Middle East peace process and reiterated Germany's refusal to fund Israeli settlements. On Soviet Union matters, Kohl supported aid to stabilize the region but stressed the need for a functioning central government to ensure arms control and economic reforms. He urged a collaborative international response to food aid and debt challenges. Discussions extended to Yugoslavia's disintegration, with concerns about potential civil war and the implications of ethnic and religious divides. Kohl and the U.S. team emphasized cautious engagement to prevent broader European instability. Kohl also highlighted the importance of German-American scientific collaborations and the need to counter Japanese economic influence globally.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

July 15, 1991

Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Germany on July 15, 1991

Bush, Kohl, and others discuss relations with France and France's views of NATO, talks between the US and the USSR over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), safeguarding the Brazilian rainforest, the Uruguay Round of the GATT, support for economic reforms in the Soviet Union, and US-German relations.

February 18, 1991

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany, February 18, 1991, 12:04-12:32 p.m.

Kohl briefs Bush on a conversation he recently had with Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati concerning the Gulf War. Bush and Kohl also discuss Soviet views on the conflict, as also recent exchanges between France and Germany on GATT negotiations.

June 14, 1968

Report of the Representative of Mexico, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, 22nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Part Two), First Commission

Alfonso Garcia Robles explained how the Mexican delegation tried to gather the support of the Latin American countries for the NPT draft. These countries prepared and presented modifications to the NPT text, and the United States and the Soviet Union accepted some of these proposals. Garcia Robles reported that the Argentinian and Brazilian representatives said they recognized the value of the NPT but would not support it if it kept its clause prohibiting peaceful nuclear explosions. The Ambassador also reported the Soviet positive reactions toward the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Garcia Robles recounted the skepticism of some delegations toward the NPT. He recommended not to sign the NPT in 1968 unless the Soviet Union signed Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which includes negative security assurances.

August 2, 1963

Antonín Gregor, 'Explanatory Memorandum [on the Limited Test Ban Treaty]'

A report produced by the Czechoslovak foreign ministry in August 1963 recommending the ratification of Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).  One of the key goals of early Czechoslovak engagement in the ENDC was to reject a nuclear test ban, based on their rejection of any verification measures. However, once the Soviets agreed to the LTBT with the US and the United Kingdom, the Czechoslovak foreign ministry praised the agreement and attacked those (such as China) who resisted the measure. One interesting aspect of the treaty was the proposed role of depositary powers. The document indicates that the Soviets were interested in being a depositary power to the LTBT in order to prevent ratification by governments not recognized by the USSR, most notably West Germany and the Republic of China. The issue of depositary powers reappeared later on, in the NPT as well.

May 1963

Undated, untitled memorandum on Soviet-US Negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

An undated memorandum, produced most likely in the late spring of 1963 (most likely in May) that outlines Soviet thinking on the most recent discussions with US representatives on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The memorandum is crystal clear that the key goal for Soviet negotiators was to avoid West German control over nuclear weapons. This is why Moscow opposed the idea of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. However, Soviet officials also admitted that it was better to agree to a treaty that did not explicitly prohibit a multilateral nuclear force as long as their US counterparts committed not to let West German authorities have an authoritative role in authorizing nuclear-weapon use

Pagination