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Soviet soldier taking a photograph of another soldier in Red Square, Moscow, 1959

Eastern Europe

Soviet Union

Portrait of Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Gate in Beijing, China, 1972.

East Asia

China

Aerial view of National Mall

North America

United States

Sino-Soviet Relations

Pyongyang photographed in March 20212

East Asia

North Korea

Cuba's National Capitol Building, January 2010.

Central America and Caribbean

Cuba

Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1984

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Eastern Europe

Poland

A photo of Joseph Stalin from 1943

Stalin, Joseph

1879 - 1953

Executive Committee of the National Security Committee during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Cuban Missile Crisis

Portrait of Mao Zedong from propaganda poster

Mao, Zedong

1893 - 1976

Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1950-1959

Mikhail Gorbachev, 1986

Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich

1931 - 2022

Nikita Khrushchev Collection

Photograph of 38th parallel crossing during Korean War

Korean War, 1950-1953

Nikita Khrushchev at the UNGA, 1962.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich

1894 - 1971

Aerial photograph of CIA headquarters

United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Photograph of Zhou Enlai in 1972.

Zhou, Enlai

1898 - 1976

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Documents

July 12, 1979	Letter from President Carter to Dutch Prime Minister Andreas van Agt President Carter writes to Prime Minister Andreas van Agt about the proposal for Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) modernization and asks for Dutch support.
April 22, 1979	Speaking notes for the talks with Vice President Mondale on TNF and NPG membership Speaking notes for the Dutch position on the modernization of Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) and also on NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) membership. Notes stress that the Dutch position on TNF is to find an approach that maximizes alliance solidarity. The Dutch are also seeking to become full members of the NPG at the ministerial level.
August 6, 1988	Letter from Un Yong Kim, President of General Association of International Sports Federations (GAISF) to the President of International Olympic Committee (IOC) Letter from IOC Member, Dr. Un Yong Kim, to IOC President, Juan Antonio Samaranch, on airspace and flight plans for the 1988 Olympic Games.
August 24, 1988	Letter from the President of International Olympic Committee (IOC) to the President of the USSR Olympic Committee Letter from the President of the IOC, Juan Antonio Samaranch, to the President of the Soviet NOC, Marat Gramov, on airspace for the 1988 Olympic Games.
September 10, 1959	Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry Hungarian Ambassador Karoly Prath summarizes a conversation about the timing of the reunification of Korea.
July 2, 1960	Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry Károly Práth reports on North Korea's Seven-Year Plan, the difference in ideological views between the Chinese and Soviets, and Korea's relations with those two countries.
June 2007	Disarming 'Osot' ideologically, 1963-73. Folder 12. The Chekist Anthology. Vasiliy Mitrokhin provides a detailed account of the KGB active measures in the case of Vladimir Dremluga, codenamed “Osot.” In 1963, at the age of 23, Dremluga was put on probation for his repeated attempts to leave the country. In 1964, Dremluga enrolled in the Leningrad University where he met Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, the leading members of the samizdat journal Chronicle of Current Affairs. A year later, Dremluga was dismissed from the University for indecent behavior. In 1968, he was sentenced to three years in jail for acting inimically to the country. While in prison, Dremluga did not disavow his anti-Soviet beliefs. Upon his release in 1971 he was sentenced again. During his second imprisonment in Yakutia, the KGB decided to proceed with active measures against Dremluga. Dremluga's second prison term had no impact on his overt anti-Soviet statements. However, he became reclusive, exercising more caution and deliberation in making new acquaintances. The next step for the KGB was to introduce him to agent “Mayskiy” (May). Agent Mayskiy reported that Dremluga's lengthy imprisonment had restricted his communication with friends in Moscow who shared his beliefs. He actively sought ways to reconnect with them. The KGB's plan was to initiate a “postal chain” for Dremluga to supposedly reestablish his channels of communication. Agent Mayskiy offered Dremluga to correspond with his peers in Moscow through Svetlana, Mayskiy's friend in Yakutsk who had an acquaintance in Moscow. Svetlana was to be reached through “Maslova,” allegedly a teacher at the prisoner's night school. In fact, all correspondence went directly to the KGB. By means of such “postal chain,” the KGB was able to work out Yakir and Krasin and, consequently, press criminal charges against them. In his written conversations, Dremluga continued to express anti-Soviet opinions. But his convictions were soon undermined by the Yakir and Krasin's trial and letters he received from the operatives in Moscow, depicting a tragic defeat of the democratic movement. Dremluga became uncertain and wavering. Having isolated Dremluga from his like-minded friends, the KGB then insisted that he repent and publicly condemn his own anti-Soviet actions. For fear of reprisal, Dremluga eventually renounced his views and condemned his activity.
June 2007	Pseudonym. Folder 11. The Chekist Anthology. Mitrokhin states that discipline was the main reason for assigning a pseudonym to a KGB agent. Some agents refused to choose a pseudonym, considering it to be humiliating. But as Mitrokhin points out, a refusal to use a pseudonym could diminish the psychological and operational effect of the recruitment process. The KGB Order No. 00430 stipulated that all recruits had to sign a non-disclosure agreement regarding their collaboration with the agency. The KGB Order No. 00235 specified that the most valuable agents had to be indexed solely by their respective pseudonyms. As a recruitment tactic, Mitrokhin notes, the use of a pseudonym enhanced agent’s awareness of the secretive nature of one’s work and accentuated the conspiratorial function of the KGB.
June 2007	Directorate K Memorandum No. 153/838, 21 January 1976. Folder 13. The Chekist Anthology The Memorandum No. 153/838 considered problems associated with the dissident movement of the Peoples Workers’ Union (Narodno-trudovoy soyuz, NTS). Vasili Mitrokhin writes that among the primary concerns mentioned in the Memorandum was the execution of complex active measures to aggravate contradictions between the leadership of various NTS groups. The Memorandum instructed operatives to observe relations of the NTS with the publishers of the journal “Continent.” In order to fuel up tensions between the NTS groups, operatives needed to, among other things, find out whether members of the “Continent” received higher payments than members of the NTS. In general, Mitrokhin suggests that the foremost purpose of the Memorandum was to gather disreputable information and undermine activities of the NTS.
June 2007	Tracking down writers of anonymous letters and leaflets, 1957-74. Folder 14. The Chekist Anthology. Vasili Mitrokhin describes investigative methods used during anti-Soviet incidents in Sverdlovsk and Serov. On November 7, 1969 anti-Soviet leaflets were distributed in the city of Sverdlovsk. The KGB collected 60 copies. It was determined that the leaflets were made on a portable typewriter of a foreign make using a standard-format paper. It was also estimated based on the content of the leaflets that the author was approximately 17-20 years old. On April 26, 1970 the anonymous leaflets appeared in the city for the second time. They were printed on the same typewriter, but differed in content. The KGB operatives collected 14 copies. Similarly to the first group of leaflets, they feature a signature of the “Executive body of the party ‘Free Russia’.” On May 1, 1970 identical leaflets were disseminated in the city of Serov. The KGB operatives narrowed down the circle of suspects to 176 students. From local testimonies, they discovered that Uzlov, a student at the Ural Institute of Engineers, had been a member of a youth organization called “Revolutionary Workers’ Party,” which was later renamed to “Free Russia.” Nikolay Shaburov (born 1945) and Victor Pestov (born 1946) were leaders of the “Free Russia.” They designed the text of the leaflets and recruited followers to help distribute the copies. Members of the “Free Russia” were arrested and convicted.

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