Khrushchev writes to Italian Prime Minister Fanfani to reaffirm the Soviet Union’s intention to sign a peace treaty with Germany, regardless of Western opposition. He expresses hope that Western powers will join the treaty but makes clear that the USSR will proceed if they do not. Khrushchev emphasizes that access to West Berlin will remain open, while criticizing any threats of war as unreasonable and dangerous.

During the luncheon for Fanfani, Bundy sent Rusk this short memo about the Fanfani-Kennedy conversation, noting the former’s concern that removing the Jupiters could lead to attacks from the right about “softness toward left-wingers who want the missiles out.” When Kennedy spoke with McNamara after the meeting, he asked him to emphasize to Fanfani the military advantages of replacing the Jupiters with Polaris. McNamara wanted to emphasize that very point to offset any talk of a “nefarious Cuban bargain” with the Soviets. Bundy also highlighted the debate between George Ball and McNamara over whether Jupiters and Polaris should be mentioned in the communique on the Fanfani-Kennedy discussions.

Fanfani covered the events of the day in this journal entry, noting that he told Kennedy he would make no commitment on the Jupiter-Polaris replacement until he spoke with McNamara. With McNamara, Fanfani emphasized the point about using the Jupiter base for space launches. Both Kennedy and McNamara denied that there was a trade with the USSR, with McNamara emphasizing the risks posed by the Jupiters during the Missile Crisis.

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 1 December 1989 describes the latest developments in Eastern Europe, USSR, Taiwan, Italy, Iran and Bulgaria.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 22 June 1990 describes the latest developments in Poland, EC, USSR, Germany, Hungary, Sri Lanka, Eastern Europe, Japan, US and Liberia.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Monday, 2 July 1990 describes the latest developments in USSR, Panama, EC, Yugoslavia, Poland, Nicaragua and South Africa.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 28 June 1990 describes the latest developments in Liberia, the Soviet Union, Israel, Japan, France, Italy and Taiwan.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 31 July 1990 describes the latest developments in Japan, the Soviet Union, European Community, Liberia, Islamic States, Egypt, Fiji and Vietnam.

Report and political analysis by amb. Ducci on the IAEA Conference. The paper discusses the draft resolution presented by Italy, US reaction , USSR attitude, as well as the position of other delegations.