1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
North America
Western Europe
1931 - 2007
Middle East
1989 -
-
1946 -
1951 -
September 9, 1996
On August 29, 1996, Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott briefed representatives from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania on the US Baltic Action Plan—a three-track strategy aimed at supporting the Baltics’ integration into Western institutions.
April 15, 1996
This document details a March 25, 1996, meeting between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas. Discussions focused on NATO enlargement, Baltic security, Russia's aggressive rhetoric ahead of elections, and Estonia’s commitment to reform and sovereignty. Talbott reaffirmed US support for Baltic sovereignty and NATO eligibility, encouraged Nordic-Baltic cooperation, and recommended addressing human rights concerns through the OSCE.
September 15, 1995
This document summarizes a September 1, 1995, meeting between Acting US Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vähi. They discussed Estonia’s desire for normalized relations with Russia, concerns over border negotiations and military pensioners, and threats from Russian officials regarding NATO cooperation. Talbott reaffirmed U.S. support for Estonia’s sovereignty, border resolution efforts, and potential future NATO membership, while also addressing U.S. concerns about press freedom and a defense procurement matter.
July 25, 1994
This document records a July 24, 1994, meeting in Bangkok between US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. The two discussed urgent international issues, including the Bosnia peace process, troop withdrawals from Estonia, Russian military pensioners' rights, and Haiti. Talbott emphasized US expectations for Russian compliance with the August 31 deadline for troop withdrawal from Estonia and highlighted the broader impact on US–Russia relations.
May 17, 1993
The document reports on Strobe Talbott's May 1993 visit to Estonia, emphasizing productive meetings with Estonian leaders and members of the Russian minority. Discussions focused on regional security, Russian troop withdrawal, minority rights, and US policy in the post-Soviet landscape, with general agreement on reform support but divergence over issues like CIS peacekeeping forces.
March 3, 2000
The document records a conversation with Leon Fuerth, Vice President Gore's National Security Adviser, discussing key issues in US foreign policy around March 2000. Topics included concerns about Northern Ireland, Russia's power under Putin, and tensions in Montenegro, China. Fuerth also expressed worries about campaign issues, particularly related to Gore's foreign policy priorities and his own potential future role as National Security Adviser.
December 16, 1999
Clinton and Blair discuss Israel/Syria, Iraq, the Helsinki Summit, translatic relations, Russia, the IMF, and Northern Ireland.
December 29, 1999
Putin and Talbott discuss the Russian Duma elections, Chechnya, Georgia, Iran's nuclear program, and START-2.
December 18, 1998
Deputy Secretary Talbott met with Media Most Vice Chairman Igor Malashenko December 8. Malashenko reviewed the domestic political situation. He said Yeltsin would remain in office until 2000 at all costs, and suggested that Luzhkov had the best shot at succeeding him. He was positive on Yavlinskiy's strength, and saw him as a possible kingmaker and prime minister in 2000. He viewed the changes in the Presidential Administration darkly, particularly given the military counterintelligence backgrounds of key figures there and in Primakov's entourage. He said that the fate of FSB Director Putin, a Chubays protege, would be a litmus test of intentions on safeguarding civil liberties. Malashenko admitted Media Most and NTV had been severely weakened by the crisis. To buy time for the 18-24 months he estimated it would take the economy to recover, Gusinskiy was negotiating to sell a further 25 percent of the company to Gazprom.
February 18, 1994
Bitterlich and Mousavian review the state of bilateral relations and the importance of debt rescheduling for Iran. Bitterlich requests a more constructive Iranian role in the search for peace in the Middle East. Both discuss schemes for regional security and the CSCE process as a role model for the establishment of new multilateral security institutions in the Middle East.