The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 29 June 1991 describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Kuwait, the Soviet Union, Palestine, Jordan, Ethiopia, Germany, Poland, Netherlands, Togo, Czechoslovakia and Lebanon.

Romania warns against international intervention, while Bulgarian officials argue that Romania's argument disavows the Warsaw agreement. Urbany closes by recommending peaceful and, if need be, other means to prevent upheaval.

In response to the arming of West Germany, Rapacki proposes a European Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.

M. Mikolajczyk discusses the Polish memorandum regarding the reconstruction and internal affairs of post-war Poland, Stalin reprimands Mikolajczyk for the extralegal approval of this memorandum. Churchill defends the memorandum, Stalin criticizes it, and Mikolajczyk emphasizes Poland's sovereignty as well as the legitimacy of the underground government in occupied Poland. Contentious discussion on the issue of the Curzon Line between Stalin and Mikolajczyk--Churchill acts as a mediator.

This text of this telegram is virtually identical to that of telegram 3234-8/220, also sent 30 August 1968.

General Pavlovsky writes to the Commander of the Polish Second Army, Brigadier General Florian Siwicki. He lists preliminary steps in Operation Danube where the troops enter from Poland into Czechoslovakia.

Report states the morale of soldiers taking part in Operation Danube is still good. But there is still no change in the unfriendly relations between Czech people and Warsaw Pact soldiers. The report describes how the Czech people are under the influence of revisionist and reactionary propaganda. It also details the conflict between Czech soldiers and Polish soldiers. It also gives an update of propaganda being broadcast through Czech radio stations.

Report of the Chief of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, Colonel General Miroslav Blahník, to Minister of National Defense Army General Martin Dzúr regarding troop exercises

Khrushchev describes the events of the counterrevolution in Hungary and the crisis in Poland. He recounts the CPSU's consultations with other communist parties in the socialist camp to determine their attitude toward Soviet intervention, particularly in Hungary. Leaders from China, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia agreed with the Soviet position, but Polish leaders opposed the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary. Khrushchev reports that following these meetings, the CPSU CC Presidium decided to prepare for an attack on the counterrevolutionary forces in Hungary. He then reads aloud an open letter which declares the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Government. He gives details about the suppression of the counterrevolution by Soviet armed forces and the positive reaction of the socialist countries. He states that the lessons of the counterrevolution are to improve relations with the fraternal parties and the socialist countries and to treat them with respect; to improve political work among students and the masses so that they are not mislead by counterrevolutionaries; and to strengthen the Soviet Army.