1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
North America
1892 - 1980
East Asia
Central America and Caribbean
-
1931 - 2007
1931 - 2022
1935 -
1912 - 1994
March 31, 1984
Information from the KGB shared with the Stasi about a high-level review of US policy by the Department of State. Presidential Directive [NS-NSDD] 54 from [September] 1982 made the main US objective to subvert Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.
October 31, 1962
Representatives from Brazil and Yugoslavia discuss the Brazilian proposal to the United Nations (1) denuclearization of Latin America, 2) Cuba will not interfere politically with its neighbors, and 3) guaranteed sovereignty for Cuba), about various leader's opinions on the resolution and about the difficulty that might be involved in the implementation of these policies.
The Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro tells the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry about Brazil's proposal to the United Nations (denuclearization of Latin America, Cuba will not export revolutionary operations, Cuban guarantee of independence) and about how difficult it might be to implement the various aspects of this resolution. For example, when it comes to discussions of the evacuation of Guantanamo, Americans "stop their ears."
A telegram from the Yugoslav Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry expressing their pleasure with Tito’s message.
The Yugoslav Embassy in Havana and Ambassador Vidakovic tell the Foreign Ministry that Yugoslavia has been mentioned in Cuban press articles for their involvement in the Cuban Missile Crisis. He also discusses other popular headlines about the crisis situation.
November 2, 1962
The Yugoslav Foreign Ministry relays to its embassies a summary of the Brazilian proposal on the Cuban Missile Crisis which, they say, mainly includes: the denuclearization of Latin America with inspections, Cuba's commitment to not "export" revolutionary operations, and guarantees to Cuba for sovereignty and independence. Allegedly, Castro welcomed the idea of the above plan. Brazil thinks that the USA could accept it after negotiations.
Yugoslav officials remark that significant publicity and acknowledgment was given to Tito’s message and initiative in regard to Brazilian President João Goulart’s messages, and Yugoslavia's activity in the UNO [United Nations Organization] has solidified their reputation as that of the nonaligned.
October 30, 1962
Fidel Castro, after his first contacts with Brazilian President João Goulart’s special envoy Albino Silva, accepted well the Brazilian thesis which contains following: Denuclearization of the whole of Latin America and the embargo on atomic weapons delivery; Inspection by UN; Cuba would commit neither to export revolution nor to carry out any subversive activities; Cuba would be given guarantees for keeping its sovereignty and independence. The USA will accept the plan after negotiations. Russians “couldn’t think of anything better.”
Vidaković speaks with Brazilian ambassador Luis Bastian Pinto on Brazil's role in the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations and Fidel's argument for Cuban sovereignty and independence.
November 3, 1962
A message from the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry (originally, the embassy in Rio), saying that they are extremely satisfied with Tito’s message which contributed to Brazilian President João Goulart’s decisiveness on Cuban crisis.