Khrushchev shares his dissatisfaction with how German and French leaders, particularly De Gaulle and Adenauer, have responded to disarmament and peace proposals. He and Nehru discuss the USSR's foreign policy toward Europe, including the fragile state of European alliances, tensions surrounding Berlin, and the possibility of shifts in West Germany's orientation. Khrushchev expresses cautious optimism that the international crisis might be resolved without war, emphasizing the need for negotiations while critiquing Western policies and leadership.

Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

Kohl and Christopher discuss various scenarios in the search for peace in former Yugoslavia after the failure of the Vance/Owen plan. They debate whether Russia would perhaps accept a lifting of the arms embargo for the Muslims in Bosnia. Moreover, they discuss the state of Germany's domestic debate on out-of-area missions.

Kohl and Ghali discuss Germany's international position after unification and the end of the Cold War. Kohl argues that many were surprised by the return of "old demons" in former Yugoslavia. He emphasizes the long-term objective of establish a new sort of European crisis management excluding a repetition of violent conflicts. This was the rational for his strong engagement in favor of the Maastricht Treaty.

Kohl and Major talk abut the forthcoming European Council in  Edinburgh. They discuss the problems of the Maastricht Treaty referenda in Denmark and Great Britain. They emphasize the need to avoid a renewed negotiation on the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, they debate the question of EC enlargement as a key agenda item in Edinburgh. Kohl makes a bold case to start negotiation on EC enlargement right away and not wait until the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in Denmark.

Bohl and Cheney assess the impact of the Yugoslavia war. Bohl emphasizes that lack of the EC consensus on fundamental security issues in contrast to its ability to regulate questions of trade and finance. He argues that this could do massive harm to the European integration project in general. Moreover, Bohl and Cheney discuss German domestic problems with NATO out-of-area missions.

Bush reports about his recent conversation with Mitterrand on the establishmet of the Eurocorps and NATO's European pillar. Kohl thinks that U.S. concerns over the Eurocorps  were exaggarated reiterating that the Federal Repubic wanted a continued U.S. military presence in Germany and Europe. Bush complains about French reluctance to expand NATO's functions including out-of-area missions.

Kohl and Silva examine preparations for the forthcoming European Council in Lisbon as well as reforms in the nomination of appointees for the European Commission. They  talk about the re-nomination of Delors as President of the Commision. In addition, they discuss the seat of the European Central Bank and the European Monetary Institute.

Nonproliferation talks entered their decisive phase after the submission of a joint U.S.-Soviet draft to the ENDC on February 21, 1967. One week later, High-Commissioner of the French Commissariat à l’énergie atomique, Francis Perrin, assessed France’s options. It was not “by accident,” he noted, the original five UN Security Council permanent members—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China—were in line for nuclear-club membership: “…they are the same profound reasons, of a geographical, demographic or other nature, which led to the choice [in 1945] … of the countries with special responsibilities in the maintenance of world peace.” After noting how advances in “India, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and also West Germany” portended the further spread of nuclear weapons—and acknowledging France had itself sought help with its weapon program—Perrin pondered whether proliferation might hasten nuclear disarmament by convincing the superpowers of its merits. In the end, however, fear of a “large and hostile” nuclear-armed PRC made him pessimistic. While he did not advise signing the NPT, it would be “very important” for France to affirm publicly, if unilaterally, “its constant policy since 1958 … not to cede any atomic weapon or any atomic explosive device to a country which does not possess it, and not to help any such country to manufacture them.” He dismissed internal opposition toward the NPT as defensive—"an a posteriori justification of the French decision to constitute an atomic armament." More significant was the likelihood West Germany would gain its own atomic arsenal, jeopardizing France’s “dominant political position among the Europe of the Six” members of the European Communities and reviving Cold War tensions in Europe. He finished with an eye-opening analysis of how the Kosygin proposal for nuclear-weapon states to extend negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon states’ signatory to the NPT would not impede the use of French nuclear armaments against a West German blitzkrieg backed by the United States.

The French decision to join EURATOM was conditioned on the regional agency not impinging on national nuclear programs. As early as 1955, French Prime Minister Guy Mollet had instructed French negotiators that “Euratom will not be an obstacle toward the possible decision of France … to build nuclear weapons.”  While EURATOM’s jurisdiction would be limited to negotiating purchases of fissile materials, promoting trade with the United States and the United Kingdom, and exchanging reactors designs and civilian technology among members of the Atlantic community, Couve de Murville credited EURATOM with a fringe benefit: monitoring West Germany. In this spring 1960 letter to Prime Minister Michel Debré about revising the treaty, he warned against the removal of EURATOM controls over raw uranium and thorium or enriched uranium. Their removal, he cautioned, would create a dilemma: “either abandon the idea that German’s renunciation of atomic armaments could be enforced or support the enforcement of equivalent controls under the West European Union, which … would interfere in the direction of our programs and the development of our nuclear weapons.”