This document discusses the capability of Kraftwerk Union AG, bid preparation for nuclear plants including the unit sizes and turn key jobs, exploration of natural uranium in Iran, and uranium enrichment facilities.

The two sides discuss nuclear fuel, the education of Iranian employees, and the building of iranian research and development capacity in Nuclear energy. Support from German industry, natural uranium, and enrichment services. 

An employee of the Deutsche Kraftwerksunion (KWU) writes to Klaus Barthelt, the Chairman of the Board, about enrichment negotiations with the Soviet Union in the context of an upcoming meeting with the President of Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The author also describes a meeting with another Iranian official who described Tehran's annoyance with France.

This is a list of participant names and notes regarding the results in keywords.

This AEC report looked at the Pierrelatte plant’s prospective capabilities, possible West German motives for seeking an independent supply of enriched uranium (possibly in cooperation with the French), the “adverse” implications of a French-German project, and policy alternatives available to Washington. If the West Germans were determined to contribute to the French enrichment project, the AEC saw serious risks including the “the prospects of a Franco-German military alliance that could constitute a European third force capable of dominating Western Europe."

Etemad acknowledges receipt of a letter from Haunschild stating that fissionable nuclear materials will not be transfered to any of the countries listed in the annex.

Etemad acknowledges receipt of a letter from Haunschild stating that in the future West Germany and Iran may cooperate " to build uranium enrichment, or fuel reprocessing installations in Iran."

In 1978 the National Security Council identified the most important shortcoming of nuclear cooperation with Germany: the non-transfer of technology for the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The lack of this crucial phase for the production of nuclear fuel led Brazil to decide to develop this method by national means, in view of the unwillingness of France and Great Britain to export said technology without a full scope of safeguards. The document reports how the government decided to create an autonomous nuclear project with regard to cooperation with Germany and free from the international safeguards regime. Coordinated by CNEN and implemented by the Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research (IPEN), this project represented the first phase of the “parallel” nuclear program whose objective was the autonomous mastery of the nuclear cycle.

Outline of the government of Brazil’s decision to acquire all phases of the cycle of production of nuclear fuel through cooperation with a foreign government, in this case the Federal Republic of Germany. Reference is made to the need to develop uranium enrichment technology in accordance with the 1967 nuclear policy, which had not yet been implemented.

A secret report addressed to Minister of Foreign Affairs Mario Gibson Barbosa by Amb. Paulo Nogueira Batista (Brazilian Embassy, Bonn) describing alternatives for the establishment of comprehensive, long-term nuclear agreements between Brazil and a “country to be defined.” The report suggests that given the trends in uranium production in the US and Europe, Brazil needed to either associate itself with France to purchase gas diffusion technology or develop, together with Germany, ultracentrifugation or jet nozzle technologies. The notion was that “countries that decide to develop their own enrichment capacity will not only occupy a privileged competitive position but also will become part of an oligopoly with obvious political implications.” Nogueira Batista was worried, however, that Germany might not be able to offer Brazil centrifugation technology under existing obligations.