Nikita Khrushchev and Jawaharlal Nehru discuss global disarmament, the Soviet Union's resumption of nuclear weapons testing, and the ongoing tensions surrounding Berlin. Khrushchev defends Soviet nuclear tests as a necessary response to perceived Western threats and the failure of disarmament talks, asserting that such actions are essential to safeguard the USSR and the socialist bloc. He reassures Nehru that access to West Berlin will remain unobstructed after the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany, though the legal basis would shift from occupation rights to agreements with the GDR. Both leaders emphasize their shared commitment to disarmament, but Nehru voices concerns that continued nuclear testing may derail global peace efforts and delay meaningful progress toward disarmament.

Khrushchev and Nehru discuss rising global tensions, particularly surrounding the German peace treaty and the status of Berlin. Nehru expresses concerns about the resumption of Soviet nuclear tests, warning of their impact on global opinion and the risk of escalating conflict. Khrushchev defends the tests as a necessary response to Western threats and military buildup. The two leaders are later joined by Ghanaian President Nkrumah to present a collective appeal from the Belgrade Conference, urging peaceful solutions and proposing a summit between Khrushchev and Kennedy to reduce the risk of war. Khrushchev emphasizes the need for global disarmament and greater involvement from neutral nations to pressure the US toward peace, while Nehru advocates for careful diplomacy to avoid further polarization.

Khrushchev and Popovic discuss the ongoing tensions surrounding the peace treaty with Germany and the future of West Berlin, with Khrushchev emphasizing the Soviet Union’s readiness to act if negotiations fail. They address the actions of Western powers, particularly the United States and its allies, and the risks of escalation, while acknowledging the importance of diplomacy to avoid conflict. Khrushchev also touches on the Soviet decision to suspend disarmament measures, the broader international situation, and internal developments in both the USSR and Yugoslavia.

Khrushchev addresses graduates of Soviet military academies, emphasizing the strength of the Soviet armed forces and the importance of peace through disarmament and diplomacy. He outlines the need to conclude a peace treaty with Germany to resolve lingering tensions from World War II, criticizing the resistance of West Germany under Chancellor Adenauer and warning against militarization and nuclear escalation. Khrushchev stresses that the Soviet Union seeks peaceful coexistence but will defend its sovereignty if necessary.

Xanthe Hall recounts her journey in nuclear disarmament, beginning in the 1980s with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK, driven by a strong opposition to nuclear weapons and an emphasis on nonviolent action. She emphasizes the importance of shifting global narratives, including the focus on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which played a pivotal role in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Hall discusses the challenges posed by current geopolitical dynamics, such as the war in Ukraine, and the difficulties in maintaining momentum for disarmament in a world still shaped by nuclear deterrence beliefs. Despite these obstacles, she remains committed to fostering collaboration across civil society and advancing a normative process for disarmament, believing that a nuclear-free world remains essential and achievable.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

Subsequent to De Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Wilson's EEC application, senior British ministers still saw the European question as having considerable importance. Shortly before his departure from the role of Foreign Secretary, George Brown reported to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that the ructions over Article 3 of the NPT would be "particularly awkward for us as potential members of EURATOM and the E.E.C." De Gaulle's second "Non!" only served to postpone Britain's membership of the EEC, as Edward Heath's Conservative government successfully campaigned for accession, which took place in 1973.

Responding to a request from Michael Palliser (Wilson's Private Secretary for foreign affairs), the Foreign Office's seasoned Europe-watcher Derek Day argued that the government needed to balance three – sometimes conflicting – UK interests. First, there was the position as a European power, particularly with regard to the ongoing EEC application. Second, there was the UK's status as a nuclear power, in which the UK shared “special responsibilities” with the US, exemplified by the UK's acquisition of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles as its primary nuclear deterrent. Third, there was the desire to see a non-proliferation treaty concluded, which sometimes meant disagreement with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Day contended that the United Kingdom seemed to have been successful in positioning itself as understanding European anxieties, with Bonn having congratulated Wilson's administration on bring “good Europeans.” Day's assessment was seen and lauded by Wilson, who hoped that it was correct.

Before and after de Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Britain's second EEC application, Britain's position in Europe and its relationships with existing EEC states shaped the UK's role in the NPT negotiations. Prior to 1967, London canvassed opinion in EEC capitals, particularly in Bonn. As the NPT negotiations wound their way through the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (of which the United Kingdom was a member) in 1967, British representatives reported deep-seated concerns in Bonn, Brussels, the Hague, Luxembourg City, Paris, and Rome that a non-proliferation agreement might threaten the continued functioning of EURATOM, namely that its power might be subsumed into the IAEA, opening non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) up to commercial espionage conducted by inspectors representing the nuclear-weapon states (NWS).

This CND pamphlet sets out the case against the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative which was being pursued by the Reagan Administration.

This letter to then Vice-President Bush sets out CND's opposition to the British Government's involvement in the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (popularly known as Star Wars).