Chirol introduces his definition of the Middle East by citing a speech given by the viceroy of India Curzon a few months before his Gulf tour as well as the work of Alfred T. Mahan.

This audio file contains a meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi high-ranking officials in which they discuss different issues. Tarqi Aziz discusses the technical negotiations in New York, and the Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991. He asks whether the sanctions will be lifted after the end of the special commission. He recommends hurrying with the commission to shorten the period of inspection and to let them use the cameras they requested in order to claim Iraq had not imposed any obstacles during the inspection process. Saddam states the special target group is concerned with future observation rather than what they have already done so far. He adds that the attempts of overthrowing the regime have failed, thus they insist on using cameras to guarantee future observation. One of the speakers advises to let the team work in a technical and a professional mechanism away from means of media which always exaggerate things and make matters worse. Saddam shifts to another subject, saying that Iraq has unmasked western democracy. They discuss European political affairs, ruling parties, socialism, and what Arabs and Asians face from offering those hard jobs and low positions requiring only physical effort. Finally, they agree to send a message to the commission saying that when you believe in an appropriate way towards Iraq, you will have positive results. 

Subsequent to De Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Wilson's EEC application, senior British ministers still saw the European question as having considerable importance. Shortly before his departure from the role of Foreign Secretary, George Brown reported to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that the ructions over Article 3 of the NPT would be "particularly awkward for us as potential members of EURATOM and the E.E.C." De Gaulle's second "Non!" only served to postpone Britain's membership of the EEC, as Edward Heath's Conservative government successfully campaigned for accession, which took place in 1973.

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

The document outlines Italy's stance on the decision-making process for the Multilateral Force (MLF), emphasizing the need for a restricted group of countries based on financial contributions rather than nuclear capability, as proposed by the UK. Italy insists on its inclusion in this committee, given its strategic importance. Responses from other nations varied: the U.S. appeared unaware of the UK's proposal, the UK favored Germany over Italy, Germany signaled alignment with Italy, and Turkey and the Netherlands raised concerns about limiting decision-making to nuclear powers. The document suggests further analysis and careful consideration of the broader implications.

British Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva (1995-1998).

This correspondence between the Ministry of Defense and embassies in Washington and London discusses the current state of NATO's (nuclear strategy) and the different views held by France, Great Britain, Germany and United States.

The telegram compiles updates from Defence Ministers (UK, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy) on the status of deployment of Pershing II and Cruise missiles decided in December 1979.

UK record of discussions with a Soviet delegation including Bulganin and Khrushchev.

Churchill, Eden, Stalin, and Molotov discuss the leadership in Poland, Britains interests in Greece and Hong Kong, the actions of Romania and Bulgaria during the war, Turkey, the need for the Great Powers to exert influence on the Balkans to prevent small wars, the leadership of Italy, interests in Bulgaria and Romania, the dividing of Germany and Germany's future, and the American plans in the war against Japan.