In 1978 the National Security Council identified the most important shortcoming of nuclear cooperation with Germany: the non-transfer of technology for the production of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The lack of this crucial phase for the production of nuclear fuel led Brazil to decide to develop this method by national means, in view of the unwillingness of France and Great Britain to export said technology without a full scope of safeguards. The document reports how the government decided to create an autonomous nuclear project with regard to cooperation with Germany and free from the international safeguards regime. Coordinated by CNEN and implemented by the Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research (IPEN), this project represented the first phase of the “parallel” nuclear program whose objective was the autonomous mastery of the nuclear cycle.

Argentina, like its neighbor, Brazil, was determined to develop an “independent nuclear fuel cycle,” with the capacity to reprocess plutonium and enrich uranium. Also like Brazil, Argentina was one of the few Latin American countries to refuse to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Thus, Argentina’s nuclear activities were under routine scrutiny to see if they involved anything that suggested an interest in a weapons capability. US intelligence agencies continued to monitor developments but perspectives shifted as Argentina’s domestic politics evolved. Prepared after the Argentine-British conflict over the Falklands Islands, in which Washington helped London, this special estimate professed “great uncertainty” over Argentina’s nuclear intentions. While “emotionally” the Argentine military leadership was interested in a weapons option, it had “reduced capability to fulfill this desire.”

Memorandum discussing the impact on South Africa of new safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the sale and transfer of nuclear materials.

Summary of a British report on problems with the export "trigger list" of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The list did not include gray area items that could be used in building nuclear facilities. To begin correcting the problem, the British announced a ban of inverter exports and asked other governments to take parallel steps. Also includes a summary of a secret British paper on Pakistan nuclear intentions. The British believed that the “piecemeal” Pakistani purchasing efforts to acquire inverters were directly related to the building of a gas centrifuge unit for producing weapons-grade uranium. Attached to the cable is a 7 November "Memorandum for the Record" discussing sharing this information with the Department of Energy.