Skip to content

Results:

461 - 470 of 792

Documents

February 21, 1951

Record of Conversations between G.M. Malenkov and M.A. Suslov with the Representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India

G.M. Malenkov speaks with representatives of the Indian Communist Party, including Dange, Ghosh, and Rao. The ICP delegation asks for Soviet advice on party organization and composition. Malenkov responds, warning the ICP to take care not to come off as a Soviet puppet. Malenkov's main suggestion is to determine a firm party line, and publish a singular and clear program for the party, so as to unite disputing factions.

February 4, 1951

Meeting of Top CPI and CPSU Comrades

Delegation representing the Indian Communist Party, including Rao, Ghosh, and Dange, discusses the internal disagreements within the ICP following the party's Second Congress, stemming largely over the question of armed struggle. Also touches on how the ICP should react to foreign policy issues, including US involvement in the Korean War.

January 15, 1950

Record of the Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan

Stalin and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan discuss India's policy of neutrality regarding cold war issues, India's relationship with Pakistan, and potential agrarian reforms within India.

September 6, 1947

Notes of the Discussion of Comrade A.A. Zhdanov with Comrade S.A. Dange, Member of the CC of the Communist Party of India

Andrei Zhdanov instructs Shripad Amrit Dange on the Soviet Union's suggestions for the formation of an Indian Communist Party, following India's 1947 Partition.

August 1, 2000

Thesis, US Joint Military Intelligence College, 'From Independence to the Bomb: India’s Nuclear Motivations, 1945-1974'

This unclassified JMIC thesis focuses both on general motivations for nuclear proliferation as well as examining the specific case of India. Its chapters focus on key issues for nuclear motivations analysis; economic motivations for nuclear power, 1945-1964; India’s bid for nuclear self-reliance, 1962-1974; India’s nuclear motivations, and implications of India’s decisions.

November 1998

Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Z Division, 'Challenges of Advanced Nuclear Weapon Development in India'

This heavily-redacted study is one of the few Z Division (International Assessments Program) documents that have been released. An unredacted portion (pp. 25-26) reports on the statements, labeled “inconsistent” by the author(s), of Indian nuclear scientists after the May 1998 Indian nuclear tests with regard to specific details of the devices tested.

September 1985

Memorandum, US National Intelligence Council, NIC M 85-10001, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints'

The most recent CREST release included this analysis of “The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints.” The analyst sought to explain why “no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred” since the Chinese nuclear test, India had not weaponized while Israel and South Africa had not “taken any action to signal overt possession of nuclear weapons.”

December 1979

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2004 Release]

This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2004 version, in some instances, contains more information through page 10 than the 2013 version.

December 1979

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release]

This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2013 release (which is currently under appeal) includes some information from a “Secret Test by Others” (Pakistan, India) and the map on page 12 that had not been released before.

October 22, 1954

Abstract of Talk between Nehru, Chen Yun, and Vice Premier Li Fuchun

Record of conversation between Indian and Chinese delegations, on a wide variety of issues in China. Conversation covers the structure of Chinese government, management of the bureaucracy, handling of finances, and plans for improving education and productivity levels.

Pagination