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Documents

December 1982

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States'

This CIA report on India, “India’s Nuclear Procurement Strategy: Implications for the United States,” has comparatively few excisions. It discusses in some detail Indian efforts to support its nuclear power and nuclear weapons development program by circumventing international controls through purchases of sensitive technology on “gray markets.” The report depicts a “growing crisis in the Indian civil nuclear program,” which combined with meeting nuclear weapons development goals, was forcing India to expand imports of nuclear-related supplies. The purchasing activities posed a “direct challenge to longstanding US efforts to work with other supplier nations … for tighter export controls.”

July 1982

Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Assessment,'India’s Nuclear Program: Energy and Weapons'

This massively excised report indicates the Agency’s strong views about releasing its knowledge of India’s nuclear weapons activities, even when the information is decades old. That many of the pages are classified “Top Secret Umbra” suggests that some of the information draws on communications intelligence intercepts, another highly sensitive matter.

July 1982

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-4-82, 'Nuclear Proliferation Trends Through 1987'

With proliferation becoming a “greater threat to US interests over the next five years,” intelligence analysts believed that the “disruptive aspect of the proliferation phenomenon will constitute the greater threat to the United States.” While the estimators saw “low potential” for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of terrorist/extortionist hoaxes was on the upswing. Significant portions of the NIE are excised, especially the estimate of Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its impact in the Middle East. Nevertheless, much information remains on the countries of greatest concern: Iraq and Libya in the Near East, India and Pakistan in South Asia, Brazil and Argentina in Latin America, and the Republic of South Africa, as well as those of lesser concern: Iran, Egypt, Taiwan and the two Koreas.

January 20, 1966

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-66, 'The Likelihood of Further Nuclear Proliferation'

This estimate updated an estimate (NIE-4-2-64) published in 1964 of the nuclear proliferation problem. That estimate, like this one, overestimated the likelihood of an Indian bomb, while somewhat underestimating Israel’s program. This assessment followed the same pattern—predicting India would produce a weapon within a “few years” and also putting Israel in the “might” category, although treating it as a “serious contender” nonetheless. Also following a short discussion of the “snowball effect” (later known as “proliferation cascades” or “chains”) suggesting that the United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria) and Pakistan were likely to take the nuclear option should India or Israel go nuclear.

May 24, 1951

Memorandum of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to China N.V. Roshchin with Indian Ambassador K.M. Panikkar, 3 May 1951

On 3 May Roshchin was at a reception of the Indian ambassador Panikkar. At the reception many different representatives were present. During the reception Panikkar expressed his great frustration over his difficult situation regarding the export of grain from China, and informed that in the current situation in India there is no way to produce the quantity of grain that they could receive from China. There was given special attention to the Czechoslovak representatives and trade delegation.

October 1977

Letter from South African Prime Minister Vorster to US President Carter on US-South Africa Relations

South African Prime Minister Vorster denies the existence of a South African nuclear program and lists hostile steps taken by the United States to exclude South Africa from international nuclear and atomic energy groups. He concludes that "it would seem... the United States officially holds the view that stability in Southern Africa and the future of our country is to be sacrificed in the hope of stopping Soviet expansionism."

September 30, 1958

Memorandum of Conversation: Premier Zhou Receives Indian Ambassador to China Parthasarathy

Premier Zhou and Ambassador Parthasarathy discuss Chinese representation at the United Nations, progress at the Sino-US Ambassadorial Talks in Warsaw, and the ongoing crisis in Taiwan. Zhou expresses frustration with American intransigence regarding Taiwan, particularly its insistence on a ceasefire, which Zhou views as an attempt "to fool the people of the world," and vows that China will continue to fight in Taiwan.

January 21, 1958

Abstract of Conversation: Vice-Minister Zhang Receives Indian Ambassador Nehru

Responding to concerns about Great Britain expressed earlier by Premier Zhou in an earlier conversation, Ambassador Nehru reports that UK Prime Minister Macmillan believes that any major powers conference on disarmament should be organized by the US and USSR. Ambassador Nehru emphasized the necessity of Chinese involvement to PM Macmillan.

June 13, 1957

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Premier Zhou’s Conversation with Ambassador Nehru'

Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian Ambassador Ratan Kumar Nehru exchanged views on Taiwan Incident and situation in West Asia.

December 3, 1956

Cable from Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong and the Central Committee, 'Discussion with Nehru on the Hungary Issue'

Zhou Enlai reports on his discussion with Nehru concerning the events in Hungary.

Pagination