This audio file contains a meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi high-ranking officials in which they discuss different issues. Tarqi Aziz discusses the technical negotiations in New York, and the Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991. He asks whether the sanctions will be lifted after the end of the special commission. He recommends hurrying with the commission to shorten the period of inspection and to let them use the cameras they requested in order to claim Iraq had not imposed any obstacles during the inspection process. Saddam states the special target group is concerned with future observation rather than what they have already done so far. He adds that the attempts of overthrowing the regime have failed, thus they insist on using cameras to guarantee future observation. One of the speakers advises to let the team work in a technical and a professional mechanism away from means of media which always exaggerate things and make matters worse. Saddam shifts to another subject, saying that Iraq has unmasked western democracy. They discuss European political affairs, ruling parties, socialism, and what Arabs and Asians face from offering those hard jobs and low positions requiring only physical effort. Finally, they agree to send a message to the commission saying that when you believe in an appropriate way towards Iraq, you will have positive results. 

Meeting minutes between Saddam Hussein and GMC Balayogi, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, regarding Inda's latest nuclear test and America's response. Also discussed is American policy toward Iraq, India, and Pakistan.

This file contains minutes of Ba'ath Party meetings, discussing the cabinet sessions and Saddam Husein's recommendations.

This excerpt is a part of the lengthy document from the Yugoslav Nuclear Energy Commission meeting held on April 16, 1979. The discussion included cooperation with different countries in the development of peaceful nuclear technology, exploration of options to acquire and sell uranium (yellowcake) on the global market without any restrictions, and joint programs in developing or exporting nuclear technology (Romania, Indonesia, and Iraq). 

The focus here is on investigating the possibility of constructing a nuclear reactor in Iraq in cooperation with France. The details are fuzzy, although it is undoubtedly the Osiraq nuclear reactor. Important for understanding the context is the fact that Yugoslavia and Iraq had already established lucrative barter arrangements on the principle “armaments for oil.” More importantly, the general undertone throughout this and other meetings of the Commission in a previous couple of years is the attempt of the Yugoslavs to find loopholes in the existing safeguards and other restrictions related to selling sensitive nuclear technology to other countries based on a belief that the NPT did not function and that the ‘nuclear haves’ were once again trying to reestablish much stricter monopoly on nuclear technology than before. 

This memorandum is a compendium of comments about the Treaty of Tlatelolco made by different delegations at the UN. It includes statements by the delegates from the United States, Brazil, Ireland, Ethiopia, Austria, Italy, Pakistan, El Salvador, Mauritania, Iraq, Greece, Spain, Tanzania, Zambia, the Netherlands, Argentina, Venezuela, Sierra Leone, Canada, Jordan, Ecuador, Guyana, Colombia, Malta, Panama, Bolivia, Costa Rica, and Peru, in that order.

Robert Einhorn is a former US diplomat. He served as the head of the US delegation to ACRS. 

ACDA Director-Designate Eugene Rostow explains his pro-Israel stance, and argues that Israel should be given an exemption from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

On 7 June 1981, the day of the Osirak raid, a policy paper composed by the ‘Senior Interagency Group on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Cooperation’ (SIG) was submitted to the NSC. The discussion paper crowned the administration’s nonproliferation efforts as a “key foreign policy objective” and called to revise the 1978 NNPA.

Although the Department of Energy dissented against other Departments' opinions on the Iraqi aluminum tubes its intelligence office went along with the prevailing view that Iraq was trying to “rejuvenate” its nuclear program.

This DIA article briefly describes Iraq’s effort to procure aluminum tubes from 1986 to 1991 and discusses the potential for their use for conventional military purposes.