Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

Enzo Perlot describes the Italian position vis-à-vis the evolution of NATO and the European Union. He predicts strengthening of the European pillar, together with incresing responsibilities.

A brief document calling for the revival of the WEU as a means of creating a deeper and more unified European defense and security cooperation.

Ambassador Petrignani reports his conversation with Vice Secretary of State Burt following Kissinger's interview in Time where he talks about NATO's crisis and need for burden sharing reform. Burt distances the current administration from Kissinger's views, stating instead that euro-american relations are "in good health", and there is no need for drastic measures.