Khrushchev shares details of recent Soviet economic achievements and discusses the possibility of a joint Soviet-Turkish dam project on the Aras River, which the Turkish ambassador, Fahri Korutürk, agrees to consider. Khrushchev expresses interest in improving bilateral relations, referencing historical cooperation, while briefly noting Turkey’s ties to NATO—a topic the ambassador chooses not to pursue.

On October 2, 1960, Nikita Khrushchev met with Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper in New York to discuss bilateral relations, disarmament, and the global political climate. Sarper conveyed greetings from General Gürsel and emphasized Turkey’s desire for good-neighborly relations based on realism and stability. Khrushchev criticized the presence of foreign military bases in Turkey, arguing they pose risks to Turkey without enhancing security, and suggested a neutral, cooperative stance for Turkey in the Black Sea region. Both leaders discussed challenges in improving Soviet-American relations and the broader Cold War context, including the recent U-2 incident. Sarper acknowledged Turkey’s economic difficulties and expressed optimism about gradual improvements in Soviet-Turkish relations. The conversation concluded with mutual agreement on the importance of diplomatic patience and fostering personal connections between leaders to achieve peace and stability.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

Kohl and Guterres look into Portugal's EC presidency and the question of EC enlargement. They agree to start formal negotiations on enlargement in early 1998 as planned. Guterres stresses that Portugal would be a major victim of enlargement as it would lose out in all areas.

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

Kohl and Mitterrand discuss NATO's surprising decision to call for Turkish fighter aircraft in the mission to control Bosnia-Hercegovina's airspace. Both criticize the fact that the decision was taken by the military without political consultations. Both Kohl and Mitterrand believe that "this was to wrong way to bring back Turkey to the Balkans."

Schmidbauer and Maleki review chances for the expansion of cooperation between Germany, Iran and the Islamic states of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, they debate the Hezbollah's involvement in the recent assassination of four Kurdish policymakers in Berlin.

A report by the newspaper Milliyet cited Foreign Minister Erkin on the Jupiter missiles. According to the Embassy’s translation, Erkin said that the Jupiter missile bases would be “dismantled,” and that Turkey and the United States were discussing their replacement with Polaris missile launching submarines. When Erkin was asked whether Polaris submarines would be provided, he replied that, “These are details. Talks are continuing.” Negotiations were indeed continuing, but it would take six weeks to reach an agreement.

Responding to Finletter’s request, the State Department provides a statement on the Jupiters for the NAC meeting on January 30, 1963. It explained that the U.S. cannot bring up the matter unilaterally until consultations with Italy and Turkey have progressed. Finletter should coordinate delivery of the statement with Italian and Turkish representatives while Reinhard and Hare work with the Italians and Turks in preparing a written statement that can be presented to the NAC at a later stage. While the Italians were willing to join the statement, it is not clear whether Turkey did or whether the statement was made to the NAC on January 30.

Kennedy’s press statements and announcements by Italy and Turkey of agreements with the U.S. on the Jupiters put the U.S. Mission to NATO in an awkward position because “most NAC members learned of withdrawal of Jupiters from press.” Moreover, an internal memo to NATO’s Secretary General complained about the U.S. failure to consult with the Alliance. Ambassador Finletter here asked the Department to provide a statement that he could make to the NAC at its January 30 meeting.

The early delivery of F-104G’s was a crucial element in the negotiations with Turkey over the Jupiters, and the U.S. planning on the deliveries was moving forward. The State Department, however, wanted Turkish authorities to understand that the timing of the deliveries “will depend on such progress in negotiations that it is clear GOT [Government of Turkey] will agree to dismantle JUPITERS.”