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November 20, 1968

Telegram Number 2206/09, 'NATO Ministerial Council'

French diplomat Lucien Paye assesses Chinese foreign policy in the aftermath of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and speculates that China wishes to exploit differences within the NATO camp.

March 1970

Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo Member Boris Velchev, Report to Boris N. Ponomarev, Secretary, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), re: Relations with Latin America

Bulgarian Politburo member Boris Velchin reports on a Bulgarian delegation visit to Latin American in late 1969. Liberation movements are characterized by mass participation against imperialism, not socialism. Latin American communist parties have a strong theoretical base, but are weak. Velchev proposes that socialist countries create coordinated economic and political strategies towards Latin American countries and aid the populist movements in their quest for liberation from imperialism. Velchin is interested in collaborating with the Soviet Union, which should coordinate the effort.

March 31, 1966

Embassy, Havana, Report on the State of the Cuban Communist Party

In a report on the Cuban Communist Party, Bulgarian Embassy counselor S. Cohen discusses strengths and concerns with the Cuban goverment. The Cuban revolutionary movement debunked the theory of geographically determined fatalism, but also displays a strong dependence on the Latin American liberation movement (e.g. Jose Mari, Simon Bolivar) for inspiration instead of socialist principles. Cohen reports negative developments including the Cuban government’s growing ambition to rule the Third World revolutionary movement and strong belief in the Cuban armed struggle as a template for all national liberation movements. The Cuban delegation strongly endorsed armed struggle as the only means of socialist advancement at the Tricontinental Conference recently held in Havana. Bulgaria must remain close with the Cuban government to help it develop economically and mature politically.

January 1964

Information of the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana Regarding the Situation in Cuba in 1963

The Bulgarian Embassy in Havana reports to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on political, economic, and cultural developments in Cuba circa 1963. Cuba is politically united, but is experiencing economic hardship after the “Caribbean Crisis” primarily because of the US embargo. In the report, embassy staff reviews developments between socialist countries and Cuba throughout 1963. Some examples include communist aid to Cuba after Hurricane Flora and Cuba’s stance on Sino-Soviet relations. Bulgaria’s show of solidarity resulted in concrete political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Embassy staff notes the drawbacks and benefits of Bulgaria’s relationship with Cuba.

March 4, 1961

Bulgarian Embassy, Havana (Michev), Information Regarding the Reorganization of the Cuban Government

Bulgaria’s Ambassador to Cuba Konstantin Michev reports on the reorganization of Cuba’s revolutionary government. In the report Michev notes that the government is realigning itself with the intent to become socialist, though not publicizing it. The realignment includes the creation of ministries and committees to oversee the transition and affairs of the country. Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Guevara are assigned key posts to manage the transition. Through the help of socialist countries, Cuba is developing independent of USA, which previously hampered Cuba’s growth and development. Michev also notes that the Cuban government is prepared to defend itself against counter-revolution and US intervention into Cuban affairs.

August 12, 1996

US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader'

Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.

January 19, 1996

State Department Telegram 008785 to US Embassy India, 'CTBT Letter from the President: India-Specific Talking Points'

A State Department telegram outlining talking points on why supporting the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was in India's best interest. As it became evident that Rao was not going to make a decision to test, President Clinton resumed pressure for Indian support for the CTBT by signing off on a letter to Rao about the test ban. The State Department sent the Embassy talking points about the value of Indian support for the CTBT for Ambassador Wisner to use when delivering the Clinton letter.

December 15, 1995

Talking Points, State Department, South Asian Regional Affairs, 'Additional Testimony and Q’s and A’s for Congressional Briefing'

State Department talking points for analyzing the issue of a potential Indian Nuclear Test. These talking points review the state of play after Ambassador Wisner’s demarche to the Indian Foreign Ministry. Recognizing Prime Minister Rao’s cautiousness, US government officials did not believe that he had made a decision to test, but they were aware that he was under great pressure to do so. Therefore, the U.S. government was working with allies, encouraging them “to urge India not to test.” Parallel discussions were taking place with the Pakistanis over the production of enriched uranium over above the 3 to five 5 percent level that could be used to fuel nuclear reactors. The Pakistanis were denying that they were producing highly enriched uranium but intelligence reports suggested that they were contemplating such action or had already begun the process.

December 15, 1995

Draft State Department Telegram to US Embassy Beijing, 'Possible Indian Nuclear Test'

The State Department writes to Islamabad urging Pakistan to not react if in fact India chooses to launch a nuclear test. On 15 December the New York Times published a story by Tim Weiner, under the headline “US Suspects India Prepares to Conduct Nuclear Test.” While some Indian journalists and policy experts were convinced that the story was a US government plant, Weiner had simply used due diligence in pursuing a lead from a non-government expert on nuclear proliferation issues. Worried that the story would exacerbate regional tensions by encouraging Pakistan to “act in a manner that jeopardizes our nonproliferation efforts in South Asia,” the Department wanted to enlist the Chinese to encourage the Pakistanis to “exercise restraint in response to these reports.”

December 12, 1995

Email, ITAIN Division Reports to Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, CTB, Nuke, 'Indian Nuclear Update'

Email from ITAIN Division to Reports to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee regarding the state of India's nuclear reactors. Directed to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the message provides a glimmer of the intelligence watch over the Indian nuclear test site. At least two sites were under observation, one where the mysterious cables had been rearranged, and the other where there was much “personnel activity.” The meaning of the acronym "ITAIN" is presently unknown.

Pagination