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November 26, 1982

Secretary of State George Schultz to President Reagan, 'How Do We Make Use of the Zia Visit to Protect Our Strategic Interests in the Face of Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Activities'

Secretary of State George Shultz’s letter to President Reagan covering the history of US responses to Pakistan’s nuclear program and future courses of action by the United States. While each option will rescind United States’ aid money, the Secretary details three different ways to go about it, with varying political implications for each.

November 19, 1982

Henry S. Rowen, National Intelligence Council, to DDCI [Deputy Director of Central Intelligence McMahon], 19 November 1982, with attached memorandum from National Intelligence Council staffer [name excised], 'Pakistan'

Despite the concerns about sharing the ALR-69 radar warning receiver with Pakistan for fear of it falling into Chinese hands, CIA officials argue that failure to meet Pakistani demands would lead to a “serious blow to U.S. worldwide nonproliferation efforts.”

November 8, 1982

'Pakistan-US: Demarche on F-16 Equipment,' 11/8/82, with Memo from McMahon to Carlucci, 'Risk Assessment of the Sale of AN/ALR-69 Radar Warning Receiver to Pakistan,'1 1/8/82, and Excerpt from Natl Intel Est on Pakistan

With delivery of U.S. F-16 fighter-bombers imminent, Pakistan threatens to refuse delivery unless the U.S. agrees to include the ALR-69 radar warning receiver for the aircraft. CIA analysts have concerns that including this sensitive radar technology in the delivery of the F-16s would enable China, a close military ally of Pakistan, to obtain and study the device.

August 30, 1971

Meeting between Soviet academic and envoy to Israel, Yevgeni Primakov and Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, 30 August 1971

Primakov came to hear a concrete offer from Golda on how to push the peace process forward. The Prime Minister was unwilling to go into specifics. Primakov informed Golda that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned there was a linkage between Israeli concessions and immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. According to Primakov, as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unsettled, the Soviet Union could not be seen as acting against the interests of its Arab allies by allowing unrestricted Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union to Israel.

June 15, 1973

Excerpts from a Record of a Meeting between Soviet journalist, Victor Louis, and General Director of the Prime Minister’s Office, Mordechai Gazit

Record of a meeting between Mordechai Gazit (MG), General Director of the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, and Victor Louis (VL), a Soviet journalist. The meeting was held the week before a summit meeting between Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev. The two discussed the immigration of Jews from the Soviet Union and the low state of Israeli-Soviet relations.

October 1976

Report on a Stay of a GDR Military Delegation in the DPRK in October 1976

Kim Il Sung and Heinz Hoffmann discuss the "axe murder" incident of 18 August, which Kim Il Sung interprets as a deliberate provocation by the Americans .

August 31, 1976

Report on the ‘Axe Murder Incident’ from the GDR Embassy in North Korea

Report on the killing of two American officers in the Joint Security Area. Ambassador Steinhofer states that this incident is a testimony of the tense situation that exists between the two sides and he provides an analysis of what the implications of this incident are.

October 25, 1982

State Department Cable 299499 to US Embassy Islamabad, 'Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Meeting with General Zia'

In a follow-up message after his trip to Islamabad, Ambassador General Vernon Walters noted that at the end of the conversation with Zia the Pakistani President had given his “word of honor” that Pakistan “will not develop a nuclear device or a weapon.”

October 17, 1982

US Embassy Pakistan Cable 15696 to State Department, 'Pakistan Nuclear Issue: Meeting with General Zia'

The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan reports to the State Department on a meeting between Ambassador General Vernon Walters and President Zia. Walters returned to Islamabad to warn Pakistani officials that U.S. aid was in “grave jeopardy” after a link between the Pakistani program and Chinese technology was discovered. A U.S. military aid package, which included F-16 fighter-bombers, was also discussed.

July 6, 1982

US Embassy Pakistan Cable 10276 to State Department, 'My Final Meeting with President Zia'

After Ambassador General Vernon Walters’ second day meeting with President Zia, the Pakistani leader verbally acknowledged U.S. evidence that Pakistan sought nuclear weapons components from abroad despite promises not to do so. However, Zia refused to put this in writing, and in a letter to President Reagan claimed the U.S. intelligence was a “total fabrication,” likely in an effort to save face.

Pagination