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July 20, 1997

Memo from Ronald Asmus to Strobe Talbott, 'Hanseatic Strategy'

This July 1997 memo outlines a proposed "Hanseatic Strategy" to support future NATO membership for the Baltic states. Acknowledging political resistance within the US and NATO, concerns over defensibility, and Russian opposition, the memo proposes a three-part strategy.

October 29, 1996

Cable, Secretary of State to US Embassy Vilnius, 'Acting Secretary and Lithuanian Fonmin on NATO Enlargement'

On October 8, 1996, Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott met with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys to discuss NATO enlargement. Gylys warned that excluding Lithuania from early rounds of accession would damage its security and risk public perception of Western disengagement, while expressing concern over Kaliningrad’s future role. Talbott reassured Gylys of the US commitment to Baltic inclusion, emphasized that NATO’s door remains open, and framed the Baltic Action Plan as a complementary—not compensatory—measure to support accession and regional stability.

October 2, 1960

Transcript of the Conversation between N.S. Khrushchev and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, S. Sarper

On October 2, 1960, Nikita Khrushchev met with Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper in New York to discuss bilateral relations, disarmament, and the global political climate. Sarper conveyed greetings from General Gürsel and emphasized Turkey’s desire for good-neighborly relations based on realism and stability. Khrushchev criticized the presence of foreign military bases in Turkey, arguing they pose risks to Turkey without enhancing security, and suggested a neutral, cooperative stance for Turkey in the Black Sea region. Both leaders discussed challenges in improving Soviet-American relations and the broader Cold War context, including the recent U-2 incident. Sarper acknowledged Turkey’s economic difficulties and expressed optimism about gradual improvements in Soviet-Turkish relations. The conversation concluded with mutual agreement on the importance of diplomatic patience and fostering personal connections between leaders to achieve peace and stability.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

December 8, 2022

Interview with Harald Müller

Harald Müller recounts his lifelong interest in nuclear issues, stemming from the Cuban Missile Crisis, and his extensive career at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). He emphasizes the dual role of nuclear weapons as both a deterrent, especially against threats like Russia's current aggression, and a danger due to the possibility of catastrophic misuse. Müller suggests a multi-faceted approach to nuclear disarmament, advocating for academic input, practical policy steps, and international cooperation, while recognizing that genuine disarmament requires alignment among global powers, including autocratic states. Despite recent geopolitical setbacks, he remains cautiously hopeful for future nuclear arms control, though he stresses the importance of conventional deterrents in a potential nuclear-free world.

This document summary was generated by an artificial intelligence language model and was reviewed by a Wilson Center staff member.

November 27, 1998

Memorandum to General Ralston, VCJCS, from Strobe Talbott

Talbott writes to General Ralston on a policy of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons being promoted by NATO allies, the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), and India and Pakistan. He summarizes his recent communications with Jaswant Singh.

July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

May 11, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on 9 May 1995 in Moscow

Kohl and Yeltsin discucss the parallelism between NATO enlargement and Russia's engagement and the timing of NATO enlargement in particular. Yeltsin expresses his disappointment about the lack of progress in the U.S.-Russian talks on the issue complaining that the "the West was about to relapse into the thinking of military blocs prior to 1990. This was not acceptable," Yeltsin says. Moreover, Kohl and Yeltsin discuss Russian sales of nuclear power plants for Iran.

September 9, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with President Clinton on 7 September 1993

Kohl and Clinton discuss plans for NATO enlargement and the need to find a modus vivendi for an intermediate period as a way to balance Russia's engagement and the security interests of the Central and East European countries. Kohl has doubts over the feasibility of NATO enlargement but is willing to search for an intermediary solution.

October 23, 1992

Meeting between ChefBK Bohl and Secretary of Defense Cheney on 22 October 1992, 9:40-10:40 Hours

Bohl and Cheney assess the impact of the Yugoslavia war. Bohl emphasizes that lack of the EC consensus on fundamental security issues in contrast to its ability to regulate questions of trade and finance. He argues that this could do massive harm to the European integration project in general. Moreover, Bohl and Cheney discuss German domestic problems with NATO out-of-area missions.

October 15, 1992

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Leading American Representatives from Business and Science on 10 October 1992, 17:00-19:30 Hours

Kohl and his American interlocutors discuss Germany's new international role after unification and particularly Germany's ties to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Kohl comes out against American request for German "leadership." He does not want to use the term albeit he acknowledges Germany's responsibility to assume  leadership on a multitude of issues.

Pagination