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Revolutionary Command Council Meeting Attended by Saddam Hussein and High Ranking Military Commanders

This undated audio file handles one of the Revolutionary Command Council meetings, attended by Saddam Hussein and some high-ranking commanders. The meeting addressed the UN and the Security Council resolutions against Iraq. Also discussed were the negotiations with Russia and France, British messages to the Russians to help release an unidentified British prisoner, frozen Iraqi assets, and biological/chemical weapons.

December 16, 1999

Letter, O'Brien to Sherard Cowper-Coles, 'Telephone Call with President Clinton, 16 December'

Clinton and Blair discuss Israel/Syria, Iraq, the Helsinki Summit, translatic relations, Russia, the IMF, and Northern Ireland.

January 15, 1950

Memorandum No.3(7)-L/50 from the Officer in Charge, Indian Mission, Lhasa, to the Political Officer in Sikkim, Gangtok

The monthly report of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, Tibet, for the period December 15, 1949, through January 15, 1950.

July 1993

Saddam Meets with Tariq Aziz and Iraqi High-ranking Officials Regarding Ekeus, Inspections, and other Matters

This audio file contains a meeting between Saddam Hussein and Iraqi high-ranking officials in which they discuss different issues. Tarqi Aziz discusses the technical negotiations in New York, and the Security Council Resolution 687 of 1991. He asks whether the sanctions will be lifted after the end of the special commission. He recommends hurrying with the commission to shorten the period of inspection and to let them use the cameras they requested in order to claim Iraq had not imposed any obstacles during the inspection process. Saddam states the special target group is concerned with future observation rather than what they have already done so far. He adds that the attempts of overthrowing the regime have failed, thus they insist on using cameras to guarantee future observation. One of the speakers advises to let the team work in a technical and a professional mechanism away from means of media which always exaggerate things and make matters worse. Saddam shifts to another subject, saying that Iraq has unmasked western democracy. They discuss European political affairs, ruling parties, socialism, and what Arabs and Asians face from offering those hard jobs and low positions requiring only physical effort. Finally, they agree to send a message to the commission saying that when you believe in an appropriate way towards Iraq, you will have positive results. 

1987

Meeting Between Saddam Hussein and His Cabinet Regarding Iran-Iraq War

This audio file contains a meeting between Saddam and his cabinet regarding the Iran-Iraq War. Saddam discusses the resolutions of the Security Council, the position of various Arab states, the role of chemical weapons and other subjects. The attack on the USS Stark is also discussed.

1987

Meeting to Discuss Security Council Resolutions and POW Issues During the Iran-Iraq War

This audio file contains a record of a meeting in which Iraqi officials discussed Security Council resolutions and POW issues pertaining to the Iran-Iraq War. They discussed the Geneva Convention and its implications, translating the text of the resolutions into various languages, and the diplomatic positions of the various members of the Security Council. They also discuss the number of Iraqi POWs held by Iran, and vice-versa.

April 29, 1993

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with the Chairman of Iran's Foreign Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee and Secretary of Iran's National Security Council, Mister Hassan Rouhani, on 29 April 1993 in Bonn

Schmidbauer and Rouhani review the state of bilateral relations. They discuss Iran's arms control policy and its interest in the aquisitation of nuclear technology for peaceful uses, as Rouhani argues. Rouhani reiterates Iran's readiness for whatever kind of international nuclear inspections. Iran's interest was still the finalization of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

January 16, 1963

Memorandum of Conversation between Aminitore Fanfani, Prime Minister of the Italian Republic, and the President [John F. Kenndy], 'Modernization of Nuclear Missiles in Italy and the Miditerranean'

Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani’s visit to the U.S. was an opportunity for he and President Kennedy to reach “a meeting of the minds” on the Jupiter-Polaris problem. The two had several conversations during the next two days on East-West relations, NATO nuclear issues, and the developing world, among other topics.  During this conversation, with only the U.S. translator present, Kennedy explained to Fanfani that Polaris/Sergeant missiles as a replacement for Jupiter/Corporals, along with Italian participation in an eventual MLF, should be announced as “whole package” rather than to have “the different points of decision simply leak out, without coherence and possibly at the wrong moment.” He believed that the main elements of the agreement would find “general approval” among most political groupings in Italy. When Fanfani brought up the possibility of announcing the U.S. request on Jupiters and Polaris and then taking it to his government, Kennedy emphasized the need for quick action, adding that it would “not be desirable to allow for prolonged discussion” of the package.

At Fanfani’s request, Kennedy explained the arrangements for Polaris missions in the Mediterranean, which operated out of a base in the Iberian Peninsula (Rota, Spain), and the various options for an MLF, either surface or submarine ships. Such an approach, Kennedy believed, was a way to improve the “position of the West.” Accepting Kennedy’s assertions about the dangers of the Jupiter missiles, Fanfani nevertheless saw a “psychological” problem involving the “prestige and strength” of Italy’s armed forces. Kennedy “indicated lively interest” in Fanfani’s question as to whether the Jupiter bases could be used for “cooperative peaceful space efforts.”

At the meeting’s conclusion, Kennedy “stressed that by the following morning they should be able to combine four or five points into a proposal that would strengthen the Italian and American position within the framework of the Alliance, thus making this meeting a gain in its cohesiveness and hence political strength.”

November 9, 1962

Memorandum from William R. Tyler to the Secretary [Dean Rusk] through U. Alexis Johnson, 'Turkish and Italian IRBM's'

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

October 15, 2020

Interview with Eran Lerman

Eran Lerman is a former Israeli intelligence officer. He served as a member of the Israeli delegation to ACRS. 

Pagination