Kohl and Gonzalez discuss the implications of the Yugoslav War on the cohesion of the European Community. Both have a shared concern that the EC could be torn apart. Eventually, they discuss preparations for the European Council in Maastricht in December 1991.

Kohl and Gonzalez discuss the potential for European integration after Germany's unification and the urge for fast action after the coup in Moscow. They review the ensuing war in Yugoslavia and the need for the Federal Republic to avoid going it alone in its efforts for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

Kohl and Gonzalez discuss the state of European integration and the situation in the Gulf. They review the preparations for the forthcoming European Council in Luxemburg arguing in favor of a step-by-step approach as the best way to achieve lasting results.

Outlines the KGB’s response to the USSR’s signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The accords obligated signatories to respect their citizens’ human rights. This gave Soviet dissidents and westerners leverage in demanding that the USSR end persecution on the basis of religious or political beliefs.

Some of the KGB’s active measures included the establishment of a charitable fund dedicated to helping victims of imperialism and capitalism, and the fabrication of a letter from a Ukrainian group to FRG President Walter Scheel describing human rights violations in West Germany. The document also mentions that the Soviet Ministry of Defense obtained an outline of the various European powers’ positions on human rights issues as presented at the March 1977 meeting of the European Economic Community in London from the Italian Foreign Ministry.

The KGB also initiated Operation “Raskol” [“Schism”], which ran between 1977 and 1980. This operation included active measures to discredit Soviet dissidents Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, measures designed to drive a wedge between the US and its democratic allies, and measures intended to convince the US government that continued support for the dissident movement did nothing to harm the position of the USSR.