Contains memos issued by the General Military Intelligence Directorate (GMID), last dated 6 July 1988, regarding the following issues: The use of chemical weapons by the Iranian Army during the Iran-Iraq War, stating dates and places where they were used; the attempts of Iran to produce chemical weapons relying on the assistance of North Korea, Syria and West Germany; developing some Iranian insecticide factories to be able to produce chemical weapons; types of chemical weapons which are used or produced by Iran, such
as mustard Gas, C factor, phosgene factor, white phosphorus, sarin gas. Page 27 contains correspondence by the Iraqi Military Attache Office in Cairo to the GMID, dated 14 September 1988, regarding information received from the Egyptian Intelligence about Iran's attempts to obtain chemical weapons from Spain through mediators and to provide Libya with chemical weapons in return for supplying Scud B missiles.

Information on the situation in the Middle East prepared by KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov in April 1973, prior to a 7 May 1973 discussion in the Politburo.

Andropov stated that given the increase in anti-Israeli propaganda in Egypt and Syria, as well as the heightened state of readiness of their armies, it was possible that a coalition of Middle Eastern states could resume military operations against Israel before, or during the upcoming Nixon-Brezhnev summit.

To prevent this, the KGB initiated a series of active measures. Specifically, they dispatched KPSU Politburo Candidate Member K.G. Mazurov to speak with Egyptian President Sadat and Syrian President Assad on the USSR’s behalf; informed the United States government through unofficial channels that a resumption of hostilities in the Middle East was not in Moscow’s interests; delayed the delivery of new Soviet surface to surface missiles to Egypt; and dispatched a well known Soviet journalist specializing in Middle Eastern affairs to Cairo and Damascus to study the situation.