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October 18, 1985

Cuban Military Mission in Angola, Report on Combat Operations, 'Informe del desarrollo de las acciones combativas en la dirección ‘Cuito Cuanavale - Mavinga,’ dentro del marco de la Operación II Congreso del MPLA-PT'

Report of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola on the FAPLA offensive in southeast Angola against the UNITA rebel forces led by Jonas Savimbi.

March 29, 1984

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Víctor Schueg and Elio Avila Trujillo

General Víctor Schueg of the Ministry of Defense in Havana and General Elio Avila Trujillo of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola discuss the 25 March battle of Sumbe in Angola.

December 9, 1983

Cuban Ministry of Armed Forces, Report on the Battle of Cangamba, 'Experiencias de las acciones combativas de Cangamba'

The Cuban defense ministry’s analysis of the battle of Cangamba.

September 2, 1949

Memorandum of Conversation Regarding Eximbank Loan to South Africa

Assistant Secretary of State Thorp, Arneson, and Wendel discuss a potential Eximbank loan to South Africa, noting that though the loan application should be considered separate from US uranium purchases, South Africa was due to become the main source of uranium in the US after the Congo's supply was depleted.

March 28, 1949

House of Assembly Debates, Union of South Africa, on Atomic Energy Bill, First Session, Tenth Parliament

House debate on the Atomic Energy Bill, which proposed controlling South Africa's nuclear energy by placing the state in charge of mining and ownership of uranium, thorium, and other radioactive materials.

October 18, 1948

Memorandum from A.M. Rosenson to Wendel Regarding Draft Economic Policy Statement

Memo from Alexander M. Rosenson, chief of the monetary affairs staff at the Dept. of State, to Wendel with the economic section of the US policy agenda towards South Africa attached.

May 26, 1948

Memorandum from J.K Gustafson to C.L. Wilson Regarding Gustafson's Conversation with Anton Gray

Memo from J. K. Gustafson to Carroll L. Wilson, both of the US Atomic Energy Commission, regarding a conversation Anton Gray had with General Smuts, the fourth prime minister of South Africa, about South Africa's uranium development and its effect on relations with the US and the UK.

May 17, 1948

Memorandum from Edmund A. Gullion to J.K. Gustafson Regarding US Policy towards South Africa

Memo from Edmund Gullion, Special Assistant to the Undersecretary, to J. K. Gustafson of the Atomic Energy Commission summarizing the most important unresolved policy issues between the U.S. and South Africa.

July 1991

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 5-91C, 'Prospects for Special Weapons Proliferation and Control'

With the term “weapons of mass destruction” having not yet fully come into general usage, this NIE used the term “special weapons” to describe nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (formerly the term “special weapons” was sometimes used to describe nuclear weapons only). With numerous excisions, including the names of some countries in the sections on “East Asia and the Pacific” and “Central America,” this wide-ranging estimate provides broad-brushed, sometimes superficial, pictures of the situations in numerous countries along with coverage of international controls to halt sensitive technology exports to suspect countries.

October 5, 1984

National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 73/5-84, 'Trends in South Africa’s Nuclear Security Policies and Programs'

Seeking “constructive engagement” with the apartheid regime, the Reagan administration wanted the South Africans to keep a lid on their nuclear weapons program. The NIE’s top-secret status was compatible with one of the elements of the 1984 estimate: that any revelations that broke the regime’s “calculated ambiguity” about its nuclear status would put Washington in an “awkward position” by “fir[ing] the drive” for the sanctions and disinvestment campaigns which the administration was trying to avoid. Analyzing the motives for the nuclear program, the CIA found it “irrelevant” to any threat that the regime was likely to face.A key issue was whether South Africa had a nuclear arsenal. On that problem, the NIE dovetailed with the view taken by NIE-4-82: South Africa “probably has the capability to produce nuclear weapons on short notice.” That was accurate, but U.S. intelligence may not have known that the regime’s leaders had already decided to build a stockpile of 7 weapons, with six weapons assembled during the 1980s.

Pagination