In the morning, Fanfani met with his advisers, and they agreed to accept the Jupiter-Polaris arrangement. He then met with Kennedy for a series of conversations on East-West issues and the developing countries. During their private meeting, Fanfani conveyed to Kennedy the conditions for the agreement—Polaris submarines would not be based in Italy, and Italy would be a participant in the MLF and a member of the NATO committee establishing it. As he noted in his diary, Fanfani asked that language referring to “bases in the Mediterranean” (“which could lead one to suppose they are in Italy”) be removed from the “minute of understanding” of the meeting. Kennedy accepted the stipulations, and a memorandum of their understanding was prepared.

Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani’s visit to the U.S. was an opportunity for he and President Kennedy to reach “a meeting of the minds” on the Jupiter-Polaris problem. The two had several conversations during the next two days on East-West relations, NATO nuclear issues, and the developing world, among other topics.  During this conversation, with only the U.S. translator present, Kennedy explained to Fanfani that Polaris/Sergeant missiles as a replacement for Jupiter/Corporals, along with Italian participation in an eventual MLF, should be announced as “whole package” rather than to have “the different points of decision simply leak out, without coherence and possibly at the wrong moment.” He believed that the main elements of the agreement would find “general approval” among most political groupings in Italy. When Fanfani brought up the possibility of announcing the U.S. request on Jupiters and Polaris and then taking it to his government, Kennedy emphasized the need for quick action, adding that it would “not be desirable to allow for prolonged discussion” of the package.

At Fanfani’s request, Kennedy explained the arrangements for Polaris missions in the Mediterranean, which operated out of a base in the Iberian Peninsula (Rota, Spain), and the various options for an MLF, either surface or submarine ships. Such an approach, Kennedy believed, was a way to improve the “position of the West.” Accepting Kennedy’s assertions about the dangers of the Jupiter missiles, Fanfani nevertheless saw a “psychological” problem involving the “prestige and strength” of Italy’s armed forces. Kennedy “indicated lively interest” in Fanfani’s question as to whether the Jupiter bases could be used for “cooperative peaceful space efforts.”

At the meeting’s conclusion, Kennedy “stressed that by the following morning they should be able to combine four or five points into a proposal that would strengthen the Italian and American position within the framework of the Alliance, thus making this meeting a gain in its cohesiveness and hence political strength.”

Referring to the telegram on McNamara’s meetings with Andreotti and Sancar, Dean Rusk requested that Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt to return to Washington for consultation as soon as feasible “to assist in developing plans to implement” the gradual withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles. To avoid raising suspicions, Rusk explained that their “return should not be simultaneous but should be arranged so as to permit overlap in Washington.” As the Turkish matter was more complicated, he advised Hare to return before Reinhardt. The “immediate objective will be to formulate best possible tactics to employ in relation to respective governments.” The Ambassadors could “very confidentially inform Foreign Ministers and/or Defense Ministers purpose of return, indicating they will be working on technical and military aspects of proposal in preparation for further consultation with both governments.”

Keating alleges that the Soviet Union is building "rocket installations" in Cuba and urges President Kennedy to take action.

The Bulgarian Embassy in Havana reports to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on political, economic, and cultural developments in Cuba circa 1963. Cuba is politically united, but is experiencing economic hardship after the “Caribbean Crisis” primarily because of the US embargo. In the report, embassy staff reviews developments between socialist countries and Cuba throughout 1963. Some examples include communist aid to Cuba after Hurricane Flora and Cuba’s stance on Sino-Soviet relations. Bulgaria’s show of solidarity resulted in concrete political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Embassy staff notes the drawbacks and benefits of Bulgaria’s relationship with Cuba.

UN Representative Milko Tarabanov reported to the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo recent developments of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The report summarizes the conference's work from November 1962-December 1962, the period following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tarabanov reports that Western powers put forward two draft agreements calling for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and underground--the proposals were debated during the 17th United Nations session.

The Cubam Missile Crisis occurred during the conference's session. Main issues discussed after Cuban Missile Crisis included: suspension of nuclear tests, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the 17th session of the UN, ways to measure nuclear weapons testing, and military alliances (NATO).

Tarabanov also addresses the inter workings of conference members--Western, socialist, and neutral--including disagreements among Western powers. In summary Tarabanov adds that the prospect for cessation of nuclear tests is poor, but notes that the US may consider closing military bases, though not under pressure of the Soviet Union or neutral countries.

The conversation takes place soon after the IL-28 crisis, which gives Mikoyan a chance to patch up the relationship with trade agreements and promises of future aid and industrial cooperation. Near the end of the conversation, Guevara and Mikoyan discuss the theory of revolutionary struggle. Guevara shares his vision that “further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries.” Mikoyan cautions him, pointing to the Soviet experience and using the metaphor of the rebellion on the battleship “Potemkin.” Hinting at further disagreement ahead, he gently registers his disagreement with the Cuban leader’s drive to ignite revolution in the hemisphere.

Khrushchev wrote to Fidel Castro to discuss the issues in the two countries' relation after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet leader attacked voices from other countries, including socialist ones, blaming the USSR of being opportunistic and self-serving. He explained the decision to withdraw missiles from Cuba, stressing the possibility of advancing Communism through peaceful means. Khrushchev underlined the importance of guaranteeing against an American attack on Cuba and urged Havana to focus on economic, cultural and technological development to become a shining beacon of socialism in Latin America. Besides, he also invited Fidel Castro to visit Moscow and discuss the preparations for such a trip.