Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

That some officials in the State Department’s European Affairs bureau were convinced that Kennedy had approved a trade of the Jupiters in Turkey puzzled State Department official Seymour Weiss, who was convinced that the higher-ups has rejected a trade. In this memo, Weiss asked a colleague, Jeffrey Kitchen, to get an “accurate reading” on the matter.

Drozniak compiles information he has collected from US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and US Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on the rising Cuban situation and US-USSR relations.

Van Roijen relates in this cable the details of a meeting with the US State Department's Bureau of Western European Affairs. With regards to Cuba, the Soviets assured the United States that they would not supply Cuba with offensive military weapons and even detailed the ranges of the missiles shipped. The construction of the bases was done in such haste that no attempt to conceal them was made, indicating the construction was on a time limit. These along with several other factors (the 1961 Berlin crisis, internal pressure within the Soviet Union) had convinced the administration that the Soviets had the fixed determination to confront the US.

Before a briefing of the neutral ambassadors by US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, William Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, asks the Swiss diplomat to meet with him. After Tyler expressed thanks on behalf of the USA for what Switzerland has done, and will yet do in the future, for the American interests in Cuba, he said that he wished to inform the Swiss official more extensively than Rusk would be able to do in front of the assembled group of ambassadors. They mostly discuss Soviet missile deployed in Cuba.

The East German Ambassador in Moscow, Rudolf Dölling, writes to the East German Secretary of State (First Deputy Foreign Minister), Otto Winzer, about several diplomatic meetings that have been held concerning US-Cuban relations and tensions. One of these meetings is between several Eastern European countries: East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, USSR, Romania and Czechoslovakia.