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2022

Antonio Mariani, 'The 36th Strategic Interdiction Brigade: An Italian Contribution to the Cold War' (Excerpts)

These excerpts from the memoirs of a former member of Italy’s 36th Air Brigade, published by the Italian Air Force, provides fascinating perspective on the shock felt by officers when they received the dismantling instructions and then how they planned and carried out their tasks. The following sentences convey the emotional reactions: “The dismantling, for those who experienced it, was a real demolition. A frenetic destructive activity pervaded the military community which, almost with anger and a certain sadism, destroyed and reduced to useless remains everything on which it had studied, worked and operated.” As the excerpts makes clear, not everything was destroyed and junked. Consistent with the Joint Staff’s original proposals, sensitive components, such as the warheads were returned to the U.S., while other parts of the missiles were salvaged and made available to other organizations. Some equipment went to Italy’s “San Marco” space research program, just as Prime Minister Fanfani had proposed to President Kennedy during their meeting in January 1963.

To what extent the dismantling procedure in Turkey paralleled the one in Italy remains unclear, at least on the basis of available documentation.

March 19, 1963

Memorandum from Major General W. O. Senter, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Systems and Logistics, U.S. Air Force, with attachment 'A Plan for the Withdrawal and Disposition of the SM-78 (Jupiter) Weapon System from Italy and Turkey [:] Operation Pot Pie

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had appointed the Air Force as “Executive Agent” for taking charge of the Jupiter removal from Italy and Turkey, and Air Force General William Senter signed off on the plan of action. Under the plan, the Jupiter’s classified components, including the warheads and guidance systems, would be returned to the United States, while remaining portions of the missiles were to be rendered “unidentifiable,” the meaning of which was described in detail (PDF p. 7): removal of the missiles from launching areas, separating the engines from the missiles, dismantling “sub-systems,” and “orderly disposition of the remaining components.”  This was consistent with the Joint Staff’s recommendations for salvage procedures to ensure that both Italy and Turkey had access to useful non-sensitive equipment and parts.  Under the plan, various U.S. military organizations, including the Italian and Turkish Air Forces, would have specific responsibilities, which were described in detail as were procedures for the return of the warheads, re-entry vehicles and guidance systems to the United States.


The dismantling operation in Italy, nicknamed Pot Pie I, would begin on April 1, while the operation in Turkey, Pot Pie II, would begin on April 15, with a “minimum of publicity” in both countries.  The plan would be classified as “Confidential NOFORN,” although, as noted, elements of it were to be shared with Italian and Turkish officials.

February 1, 1963

OSD [Office of Secretary of Defense] Telegram 020123Z to Department of State

By late January, the negotiations with Turkey were bogged down, with Defense Minister Sancar asking for a Turkish military presence on the Polaris submarines as well as delivery of nuclear weapons for the F-100 Super Sabres before the Jupiters were replaced. Without a formal agreement on the Jupiters, the U.S. government held back from a decision on another matter: the delivery of F-104G fighter-bombers. Nevertheless, Defense Department officials approved a decision to “provide first available aircraft” in April 1963, which was necessary to authorize the Air Force’s “preliminary preparatory actions.” The U.S. would preserve its “bargaining position” by informing Turkey in writing that an “accelerated delivery date will become firm upon satisfactory conclusion of current US/Turkey negotiations.”

December 27, 1962

JCS Telegram 7947 to USCINCEUR [Commander-in-Chief European Command], CINCLANT [Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command] and DSTP [Director Strategic Target Planning Staff], Offutt Air Force Base, Info for CINCSAC [Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command]

This urgent message “of the highest sensitivity” from the Joint Chiefs to top commanders began with a misrepresentation of President Kennedy’s decision: “serious consideration [is] being given to withdrawal of JUPITERS from Italy and Turkey.” The recipients—General Lyman Lemnitzer [CINCEUR], Admiral Robert Dennison [CINCLANT], and General Thomas Power [DSTP]—were to assume that Italy and Turkey had agreed to the decision, that withdrawal of the Jupiters would occur by April 1, 1963, and that Polaris submarines would be in the Mediterranean by that date. Both USCINCEUR and DSTP, who directed work on the SIOP, were to consider retargeting requirements once the Jupiters went offline. CINCLANT was to consider the feasibility of deploying one, two, or three submarines.

August 31, 1962

Speech by Senator Keating, "Soviet Activities in Cuba"

Keating alleges that the Soviet Union is building "rocket installations" in Cuba and urges President Kennedy to take action.

October 29, 1962

Cable no. 333 from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Havana (Pavlíček)

Pavlicek informs Prague that negotiations have proceeded with some progress, while there is still a tense aura in the air. An invasion of Cuba by the United States is now an unlikely prospect, given American failures to penetrate Cuban airspace, the quick organized response of the Cuban armed forces, and the widespread support Cuba receives from the socialist countries of the world. Pavlicek promises the Czechoslovak government that the embassy will make all necessary provisions to providing information on the ongoing negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

October 28, 1962

Report to CPCz General Secretary Antonin Novotný

Further reports from Pavlicek indicate despite soft rhetoric from the United States indicating a willing to negotiate, aggressive preparations against Cuba continued. In particular, there was a large reinforcement of air force bases in Florida and Key West, as well as an announcement of increased intensity of air reconnaissance over Cuba. By the time of this message, there already have been exchanges between Cuban anti-aircraft guns and U-2 recon planes. However, there are no significant measures observed among military installations in Europe, with Czechoslovak troops maintaining maximum combat readiness. Very few instances of insubordination and dissent are found.

October 23, 1962

Telegram from Mexican Embassy, Havana

A telegram from the Mexican Embassy in Cuba describing that the government of Cuba had given the order to be at battle stations to all its armed forces in anticipation of an air attack against Cuba by the United States.

November 2, 1962

Telegram from Soviet Envoy G. Zhukov to CC CPSU

Soviet envoy to the UN, G. Zhukov, reports to the Soviet leadership on his discussion with US diplomat John McCloy. The US diplomat said that the US hoped the U2 spy plane pictures taken the day before will show that the withdrawal of Soviet Missiles was proceeding as agreed. Provided that progress was made on the issue of Cuba, further cooperation between the two superpowers was possible, including an agreement on an atmospheric test ban and on the militarization of the outer space.

October 27, 1962

Robert F. Kennedy, Memorandum for Dean Rusk on Meeting with Anatoly F. Dobrynin

Robert Kennedy relays the results of a meeting with Dobrynin regarding the shooting down of an American plane over Cuba and the presence of long-range missiles there.

Pagination