Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

Estimating the current situation and probable developments in East Germany through 1955.

Charles Bohlen, ambassador to the Soviet Union, speculates on liberalization reforms in East Germany and their potential impact on Soviet leadership and the reaction of other Satellite nations, following the East German uprising.

A CIA report states updates regarding East German workers, many of which had fled to West Berlin during the uprising on June 16-17, and their plan to continue resistance at their place of employment.

This report by the National Security Council discusses Soviet control over Eastern Europe, barriers to Soviet control of the satellites, and the power threat that consolidation poses to the United States. As a result, the NSC recommends that United States pursue a policy of resistance towards Soviet domination of its Eastern European satellites, and should impose pressure and propaganda to weaken Soviet influence.

This CIA report contains an assessment of the situation in East Berlin; while East Sector is relatively quiet, general unrest still exists with strong indications of upcoming workers strikes.

The United States Psychological Strategy Board discusses implementation of previously-discussed plan, NSC 158, as well as other proposals for responding to the East German riots.

This CIA report contains a chronological breakdown of the nature and extent of the riots and demonstrations in East Germany, and descriptions of the Soviet reaction, East German capabilities, East German government reaction, and the Soviet policy reaction. According to the report, at this point, the USSR has not yet revealed any long-term policy reaction to the German situation.

This intelligence report presents and analyzes Soviet policy in East Germany before, during, and after the East German Uprising. The report assesses potential actions the Soviets could take in the future towards East Germany, and the likelihood of each.

This CIA report contains information regarding disturbances in various East German cities, beginning on 2 August, 1953.