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Nuclear Proliferation

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South Asia

India

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Indian Nuclear History

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West Germany

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United States. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research

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Hughes, Thomas Lowe

1925 -

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United States. Central Intelligence Agency

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Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Soviet Nuclear History

South African Nuclear History

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November 1992	Defense Intelligence Assessment, US Defense Intelligence Agency, DST-1540Z-509-92-SI, 'Nuclear Proliferation Data Sheets' This extract from a collection of DIA reports on national nuclear weapons programs, focuses on North Korea – which is discussed in the both the key judgments section as well as in a chapter which examines several aspects of the North Korean nuclear program. The chapter examines North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure, fuel cycle, the extent of foreign assistance, treaty obligations, the nuclear program and possible future developments, and delivery vehicles.
April 24, 1991	John T. Kriese, US Defense Intelligence Agency, 'Talking Points for Briefing to House Energy and Commerce Committee – Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations' These talking points, prepared by John T. Kriese who at the time was both chief of the Nuclear Energy Division at DIA and chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Community, focused on the intelligence the US had available on the Iraqi nuclear program.
September 1985	Memorandum, US National Intelligence Council, NIC M 85-10001, 'The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints' The most recent CREST release included this analysis of “The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation: Balance of Incentives and Constraints.” The analyst sought to explain why “no additional overt proliferation of nuclear weapons has actually occurred” since the Chinese nuclear test, India had not weaponized while Israel and South Africa had not “taken any action to signal overt possession of nuclear weapons.”
February 1980	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Project Division, 'Proliferation Analysis and International Assessments' This issue of Proliferation Analysis and International Assessments includes a heavily excised article on Iraq, a piece on South Africa’s security prospects, and a apparently a third essay that has been wholly exempted. The essay on South Africa’s nuclear aims suggests that the arguments pro and con for a nuclear capability to deal with regional security threats are so powerful that “internal political and bureaucratic” consideration are probably more relevant for nuclear decisions.
December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2004 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2004 version, in some instances, contains more information through page 10 than the 2013 version.
December 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI IIM 79-10028, 'The 22 September 1979 Event' [2013 Release] This study begins, as the National Security Council requested, by assuming that the September 22, 1979 Vela event was a nuclear detonation. It discusses the possibility that the detonation could have occurred due to an accident, and noted the Defense Intelligence Agency’s suggestion that the Soviet Union might have had reasons to conduct a covert test in violation of its treaty commitments. But most of the study is concerned with other possibilities to explain the incident – a secret test by South Africa or Israel, or India, or Pakistan, or a secret joint test by South Africa and Israel. The 2013 release (which is currently under appeal) includes some information from a “Secret Test by Others” (Pakistan, India) and the map on page 12 that had not been released before.
October 1979	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, NI-IIM 79-100213, 'Iraq’s Nuclear Interests, Programs, and Options' This report found “no hard evidence” that Iraq was intent on a nuclear weapons capability. Nevertheless, considering the scope of Iraq’s “ambitious” nuclear program, intelligence analysts concluded that the Baath regime was covertly seeking a weapons capability to support its pursuit of regional hegemony and to match the perceived Israeli nuclear threat.
June 1978	Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Projects Division, 'Proliferation Group Quarterly Report, January – March 1978' This issue includes an extract from a recent study on Pakistan and two highly technical articles relating to on-going research to identify the signatures of high explosives used for the implosion method of nuclear detonation. It also includes a report that utilized open literature and classified intelligence, including two satellite photographs, the purpose of the article is to illuminate how the South African Government intended to use the site, down to the depth and thickness of the bore holes.
July 1978	Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, US Director of Central Intelligence, 'South Africa’s Nuclear Options and Decisionmaking Structure' Memo reports that during the period the Carter administration was putting pressure on South Africa to avoid the nuclear weapons route, but the analysts suggested that even if the South Africans signed the NPT and accepted IEAE safeguards they would continue to pursue a “covert program.”
September 1977	Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Special Projects Division, 'South Africa: Motivations and Capabilities for Nuclear Proliferation' This report for the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) pointed to downsides of US and international pressures against pariah or otherwise beleaguered states such as South Africa and Israel and against would-be nuclear proliferants. They might cooperate to advance their goals.